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analysis of the program and any cost figure is somewhat speculative. Several major issues deserve review, including the comprehensive definition of hazardous waste under the rules and the limited extent to which EPA has been able to vary program requirements based on the degree of hazard of the waste. This program will impose a substantial additional burden in terms of the time, effort, and financial resources required of the private sector in meeting the information requirements imposed by the program.

#### 10. Electroplating Pretreatment Standards and General Pretreatment Standards

Electroplating pretreatment rules establish national, technology-based standards requiring roughly 90 percent removal of the toxic pollutants (heavy metals and cyanide) discharged by the electroplating industry into municipal sewage treatment systems. EPA estimated that in order to meet these pretreatment standards the electroplating industry would incur capital costs of \$1.3 billion and annual costs of \$490 million (in 1976 dollars). Electroplaters have been shown to be a major source of toxic water pollution. In addition to the categorical electroplating pretreatment standards, EPA also promulgated general pretreatment regulations requiring municipal sewage treatment systems to establish pretreatment programs. These regulations establish a national program for controlling industrial discharges into municipal sewage systems. EPA will review its pretreatment program to evaluate whether it appropriately balances environmental protection, economic impacts, and flexibility for states and localities.

#### DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

##### 11. New Drug Application Requirements

This set of regulations (21 CFR 314) governs the submission and review of new drug applications. It involves requirements for testing and marketing of all drugs to be used by consumers in the United States. Concern from the public, Congress and the drug industry about delays in the existing process and its cost justifies a thorough review.

12. Medicaid Regulations Affecting States

At present a variety of regulations impose significant administrative requirements on States. States contend that these regulations hamper their ability to provide services to needy people at reasonable funding levels. In addition, the President has promised States that regulatory relief will accompany his proposal to limit Federal Medicaid expenditures. For these reasons, a thorough review is warranted.

Hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutional health care providers are subject to myriad, frequent and duplicative surveys and reviews. Many of these reviews are a result of the Federal government's role in insuring the health and safety of patients. Given an expanding role and improved performance by State and local governments and voluntary organizations in this area, a reassessment of the appropriate Federal role is warranted.

#### DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

13. Health Care Institutions Certifications and Surveys

14. Minimum Property Standards for one- and two-family dwellings and multifamily dwellings

The Minimum Property Standards (MPS) are composed of numerous design, construction, and amenities criteria used as requirements for new residential construction under HUD mortgage insurance, public housing, and rent subsidy programs. In September 1980 HUD proposed to delete "livability" and "marketability" standards from the One- and Two-Family MPS. An expanded review would examine whether much more extensive deletions may be in order. For numerous objectives of the MPS, alternative government programs and private market forces (e.g., local building codes, homebuilders' warranties) may achieve the same purposes. No improvements in the MPS for Multi-Family Dwellings have been proposed to date, but there appear to be equally strong grounds for a comprehensive review of them as well.

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

15. Surface Mining Rules

These regulations implement the Surface Mining Act, which sets forth techniques that must be used for surface mining, particularly recontouring and reclaiming the land

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afterswards. The requirements for original contour and vegetation may preclude more useful or aesthetic treatment. These rules not only raise the cost of surface mining, but could render some areas uneconomical to mine at all.

These regulations govern competitive lease sales for coal on Federal lands. They determine the rate at which coal will be made available (target-setting procedures), and withdraw some areas entirely from coal mining ("unsuitability" criteria). In the West, where Federal lands contain the major share of total coal reserves, excessively restrictive management can cause shortages, lessen competition, and raise coal prices.

#### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Rules implementing Executive Order 12250 to coordinate the implementation of Federal laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex or handicap in programs receiving Federal financial assistance warrant review. Under this Executive Order, DOJ has a leadership and coordination role which includes issuing regulations affecting non-discrimination programs in other Federal agencies.

#### DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

On January 16, 1981, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration published regulations effective April 15, 1981 that require employers to institute hearing conservation measures for all workers in general industry (except agriculture and construction) exposed to noise levels equal to or exceeding an eight-hour time weighted average of 85 decibels. This rule is an outgrowth of the occupational noise standard revision which was first proposed in 1974. The issues of the permissible exposure level and the appropriate method of compliance with that level should be reviewed. In any case, the hearing conservation measures,

themselves, are expensive (over \$250 million annual costs), controversial (petitions challenging the rules have been filed in three Courts of Appeals) and possibly not cost-effective (the standards are alleged to be too design-specific and not performance-oriented enough).

#### 19. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Policy

The Federal Contract Compliance programs are administered under the authority of a 1965 Executive Order (11246) and subsequent legislation. These regulations need to be examined to determine if they exceed legal requirements. To a large extent these regulations impose specification standards on government contractors. These should be reviewed to see if broad performance standards could replace the tight specifications. There is an overlap between ECCC's statutory authority and the Department's Executive Order 11246 authority. The Department's regulations place more stringent requirements on firms that do business with the government than the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires of other businesses. The appropriateness of such dual tiering should be examined.

#### 20. Prevailing Wage

Under the Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Acts, the Department of Labor establishes minimum rates, based on a prevailing wage concept, for wages and benefits paid to workers by Government construction and service contractors. The original intent of these laws was to prevent competitive Government procurement from depressing wages below minimum rates prevailing in localities where Federal contracts are being implemented. Their effect over time (since 1931 for the Davis-Bacon Act and since 1965 for the Service Contract Act) has been to escalate wages above rates prevailing in the private sector. This happens because contractors can pass through wage costs without having to worry about competition. Service contract costs are determined largely by wage and benefit levels (about 75 percent of contract costs) and construction costs are about 25 percent labor related. The Davis-Bacon Act covers at least \$30-35 billion per year of construction contracts. The Service Contract Act covers an additional estimated \$5-10 billion per year of Federal contracts for services.

#### 16. Federal Coal Management Programs

These regulations govern competitive lease sales for coal on Federal lands. They determine the rate at which coal will be made available (target-setting procedures), and withdraw some areas entirely from coal mining ("unsuitability" criteria). In the West, where Federal lands contain the major share of total coal reserves, excessively restrictive management can cause shortages, lessen competition, and raise coal prices.

#### 17. Leadership and Coordination of Nondiscrimination Laws

Rules implementing Executive Order 12250 to coordinate the implementation of Federal laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex or handicap in programs receiving Federal financial assistance warrant review. Under this Executive Order, DOJ has a leadership and coordination role which includes issuing regulations affecting non-discrimination programs in other Federal agencies.

#### 18. Occupational Noise

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

## 27. Use of Published Indices to Determine Inventory

Many taxpayers, especially small businesses, do not currently use the dollar value LIFO method of accounting for inventory because existing rules relating to the computation of inventory price indexes used in connection with the dollar-value LIFO method of inventory valuation are perceived as being too complex and burdensome. IRS proposed on January 16, 1981 amendments to the LIFO regulations that would permit taxpayers to use price indexes prepared by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics in lieu of computing an inventory price index based on their own inflation experience. The objective of the amendments is to provide taxpayers with an alternative, simplified, method of computing an inventory price index that will make the use of the dollar-value LIFO method easier to understand and use. However, unresolved technical issues that were not addressed in the proposed rulemaking, such as the application of the 80 percent limitation to the inflation rate for a period of more than one taxable year, need to be addressed.

EPA Rule Changes

The Environmental Protection Agency today announced final action to remove several procedural restrictions from EPA's "bubble" policy. At the same time, the Agency approved a New Jersey state rule that reflects the new approach. These changes, which affect hydrocarbons, will significantly expand the number of sources that can use a "bubble" approach to controlling pollution. They will also reduce the degree of Federal involvement in state decisions involving "bubbles" to the minimum necessary to carry out the Clean Air Act. Together, these two changes should result in cheaper pollution control and greater pollution reductions at the same time.

The bubble policy involves treating the various

stacks of a factory as though they were one emission point under a large dome or bubble, rather than as separate entities to be rigidly regulated individually. Thus, in contrast to the traditional approach where government officials set specific emission standards at each pollution source within a factory, the bubble permits plant managers to propose their own emission standards -- tightening them in places where it is least costly, and relaxing or even eliminating them where pollution control costs are high. The bubble is a voluntary program.

The changes announced today make the following two major changes in EPA's "bubble" policy.

1. The Clean Air Act generally requires EPA to review, and affirmatively approve, all elements of a "state implementation plan" to meet air quality standards. The requirement of affirmative approval was designed to allow EPA to make sure that the particular control approach the state has chosen will in fact meet the air quality standards on schedule.

Because of the characteristics of hydrocarbon emissions, however, EPA concluded that review of each separate state "bubble" transaction was not needed to meet this basic statutory purpose if a state approved such "bubbles" through tightly-drawn rules like New Jersey's. Hydrocarbons are controlled because they react in the atmosphere to form photochemical oxidants or "smog". Smog is a broad, area-wide problem, and EPA believes that all hydrocarbon emissions within a broad geographic area contribute equally to it. Accordingly, if total emissions of hydrocarbons in an area will not increase, EPA believes that the state may allow sources to rearrange their emissions under rules like New Jersey's within that total without case-by-case EPA approval.

The impact on air quality of certain other pollutants -- such as sulfur oxides and particulates -- appears much more dependent on the exact location of an individual source. EPA is now studying the extent to which the present requirement of affirmative Federal approval could be relaxed for these sources.

2. Previously, EPA did not allow "bubble" transactions to involve sources for which EPA had not issued recommended control standards. The purpose was to make sure that emissions increased under a "bubble" would not be balanced by reductions that would have been legally required in any event. To allow that would in effect allow bubbles to lead to emission increases rather than to achieving a given emission reduction at a decreased cost.

EPA today is loosening its application of this basic policy, but not abandoning it. Sources can now participate in a "bubble" whether or not EPA has issued recommended standards regarding them as long as the state has defined and requires an acceptable minimum level of control.

The New Jersey rule approved today also contains a number of safeguards to help assure that it will work properly. Public notice of all "bubbles" will be given, and public comment will be invited by the state on the more important ones. Also EPA will be informed of any adjustments of emission limitations under a "bubble" so that it will know what control requirements are legally binding and enforceable.



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON  
March 25, 1981  
*SP*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Regulatory Oversight

President Reagan has made regulatory relief one of the top priorities of his economic policy. He has asked me, as Chairman of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, to take clear, constructive, and decisive action to restrain Federal regulation and to improve the regulatory process. Through Executive Order 12291, issued February 17, 1981, President Reagan has directed the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, subject to the direction of the Task Force, to coordinate Executive branch regulatory policies.

This approach renders unnecessary the Regulatory Council, established by President Carter in 1978 as part of his efforts to gain control over the regulatory agencies. To avoid duplication of Task Force efforts and to ensure consistent direction to the agencies, the President has directed me to disband the Council effective immediately.

One major activity of the Council has been to publish, at least every six months, a unified "Regulatory Calendar" describing the goals and anticipated effects of major regulations under development. This is a useful effort which will be continued under the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget. I request that you continue to participate in this project and to provide the information which will be requested.

George Bush

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON  
March 25, 1981

SPECIMEN OF LETTER SENT TO INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

Dear

President Reagan is deeply concerned about the burden of Federal regulations and paperwork, and strongly believes we need to reduce the intrusion of the Federal government into our daily lives. He has established a Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which I chair, and he has issued Executive Order 12291 to establish procedures for careful review of new and existing regulations to assure their compliance with his goals of reducing regulatory burdens.

In this Executive Order, President Reagan ordered cabinet departments and agencies to choose, among feasible alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to society. To help focus these efforts, he ordered that these agencies prepare a regulatory impact analysis of major regulatory actions. We appreciate that your organization's internal procedures may make it difficult for you to comply with every provision of Executive Order 12291. For upcoming major regulations, however, I am requesting that you voluntarily adhere to Sections 2 and 3 of the Order. To the extent you can comply with the spirit of the Order, this will help demonstrate to the American people the willingness of all components of the Federal government to respond to their concerns about unnecessary intrusion of government into their daily lives.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

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By the enclosed communication, I have today carried out the President's wish to disband the U.S. Regulatory Council. You should note, however, that the staff will continue to prepare for publication the extraordinarily useful Regulatory Calendar. We solicit and urge your continued, and valued, participation in the Regulatory Calendar Project.

President Reagan joins me in asking for your cooperation. Working together, we will be able to coordinate and reduce the cumulative burden of needless and overly rigid government regulation.

Sincerely,

George Bush

Enclosure

SPECIMEN OF LETTER SENT TO SMALL BUSINESS GROUPS

March 25, 1981

Dear [Redacted]

As you may know, President Reagan has asked me to chair his Cabinet-level Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Unlike many efforts in the past, the Task Force's job is not to study regulation, but to reform regulation.

We need your participation in this effort. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige is a member of our Task Force and will serve as the Task Force's principal contact with the small business community. I hope you will work with Mr. Baldrige to provide us with much-needed information.

Your organization is comprised of many people who have direct experience with the effects of government regulation. Therefore, would you please send us documentation of instances in which specific regulations could be changed in order to increase benefits or decrease costs, thereby generating greater net benefits overall?

We would like to have your first ten priority issues listed first. In the interest of time, it would be especially useful to us if you would be specific in the ways you wish these changed -- whether legislation would be required; whether agencies could make the change on their own initiative and how; and any other staff work that would speed up the process, such as proposed language. It is also important that you include with this report a one-page summary of each regulation issue in the format indicated on the enclosed sheet. (We know that some groups have already submitted similar reports to the Task Force and the agencies. For such reports, it would be sufficient simply to prepare the one-page summaries, including reference to the recipient of the underlying material so that we can ensure coordination.)

We'd like your input by May 1, 1981. You should send this summary, together with supporting documentation, to the agency head responsible for enforcement of the regulation. To help us coordinate, we'd like you to send a copy of the one-page summaries to Mr. Baldrige, to the Executive Director of the Task Force and to my office.

I appreciate your consideration on this matter. Together we can provide the regulatory relief our economy desperately needs.

Sincerely,

George Bush

## NOTES ON REGULATION AND REGULATORY RELIEF

Suggested Format of One-Page Summary of Review Requests

Source of Rule: (Agency enforcing the regulation  
regulation  
(Precise legal reference)

Citation: (Adverse impact)  
(Defensible estimate)  
(Defensible estimate)

Description of Problems: (Nonquantifiable impacts)

Estimated Cost: (Name, title, address and telephone number of the person to contact with questions)

Estimated Benefit:

Other Impact:

Originator: Original, with supporting documentation, to the Secretary or head of the enforcing agency.

A copy of the summary page to each of the following:

The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige  
Secretary of Commerce  
Washington, D.C. 20230  
Attn: Regulatory Relief

A copy of the summary page to each of the following:

Dr. James C. Miller III  
Executive Director, Presidential Task Force  
on Regulatory Relief  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20503  
Attn: Regulatory Relief

C. Boyden Gray, Esquire  
Office of the Vice President  
Washington, D.C. 20501  
Attn: Regulatory Relief

I. General Statistics

90 Federal agencies have some regulatory responsibilities. The eleven cabinet agencies and EPA issued more than 5,000 new regulations in 1980.

The Federal Register filled more than 87,000 pages in 1980, up from 20,000 in 1970, and increasing at the rate of 10,000 pages per year.

Budget expenditures on regulatory programs at the principal regulatory agencies amounted to at least \$4 billion in FY 1980. The total cost of regulation may exceed \$100 billion annually. Environmental regulation, according to CEQ, will cost more than \$500 billion over the next 10 years.

II. Regulatory "Freeze"

The postponement in effective dates of final regulations affected 12 agencies:

USDA	Interior
Commerce	Justice
Education	Labor
Energy	Transportation
HHS	Treasury
HUD	EPA

A. 172 regulations that had already been issued in final form but which had not yet taken effect were initially postponed.

- 41 were released during the 60-day period.
- About 100 more will be released on March 30, when the postponement ends.
- The remaining 30 or so will be further postponed and reconsidered.

- B. An indefinite number of regulations that were about to be issued in final form--a hundred or more--were held up. Twenty-one of these regulations were released during the 60-day period.
- C. 44 final regulations were issued on an emergency basis, without going through the postponement process.

III. Executive Order

223 submissions had been received under the Executive Order by close of business, March 23. New submissions are arriving at a rate of 30 per day, which would translate to 7,500 annually. (Each rule will be reviewed twice, first as a proposal and later as a final rule.)

IV. Initial Impact of "Freeze" and Executive Order

During the month of January 1981, the average daily length of the Federal Register increased by 50 percent over the average for the previous year. By the end of February, after the postponement and freeze, the Federal Register was 25 percent shorter than the average for the previous year. The average daily number of proposed and final rules each declined by at least 50 percent after the postponement and Executive Order were announced, compared to the average for the month of January.

Average Number Per Day

	Final Rules	Proposed Rules	Federal Register Pages
Jan 2 - Jan 29	38	24	525
Jan 30 - Feb 17	22	17	244
Feb 18 - Feb 27	19	11	254

Note: the postponement was issued on January 29; the Executive Order was signed on February 17.

Among the regulations withdrawn or deferred since the announcement of the Task Force and the regulation postponement are:

Agency	Regulation	Capital Cost (in millions of dollars)	Annual Cost	Final
Education	Bilingual Education	--	180-590	180-590
Transportation	Passive Restraints	100	50	50
OSHA	Chemical Labelling	650-900	340-470	340-470
EPA	Garbage Truck Noise	--	30	30

V. Paperwork Burden

OMB's inventory of reporting requirements contains 3,829 active reports, accounting for a total of 195 million burden hours. (That understates the annual burden, since additional reports will be added during the course of the year.) OMB processes 3,000 transactions annually, covering 50 agencies. The two largest reports are:

- Medicare Forms 30 million hours
- Food Stamps 18 million hours

IRS tax forms are not covered. When they and other agencies are brought into the system, annual burden hours will increase to 1.25 billion hours, annual transactions to 10,000.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

April 6, 1981

FACT SHEET

President Reagan's Program for the U.S. Automobile Industry

Promptly after taking office, President Reagan appointed a Cabinet-level Task Force to examine the problems of the U.S. auto industry. Based on the advice of the Task Force and other Presidential advisers, he has adopted a positive program to address directly the immediate problems of depressed sales, record losses, and severe unemployment. The program also addresses the industry's critical longer term needs to offer new competitive models and to reduce unit costs.

BACKGROUND ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY

The Situation is Serious

- o In 1980 a stagnant and inflationary economy reduced sales of U.S.-made cars to the lowest point in 19 years. Compared with only three years earlier, total auto sales (domestic and imported) were down 20 percent, and sales of light trucks and vans were down 35 percent.
- o The domestic companies incurred unprecedented losses of \$4.3 billion in 1980.
- o The downturn in auto sales has exacted a severe human toll. Over 180,000 auto workers are on indefinite layoff, 300,000 more are estimated to be unemployed in supplier industries, and another 100,000 are out of work in the dealer network.

The Problems are Longer Term as well as Cyclical

- o Not only are sales depressed because of the stagnant economy, but the U.S. auto industry has experienced a dramatic change in its markets, induced by escalating energy prices. As gasoline increased from 70¢ per gallon in January 1979 to \$1.35 per gallon in February 1981, consumer demand shifted dramatically to small cars. Partly as a result, imports increased from 18 percent to 28 percent of all auto sales during that same period.

- o The auto industry is also burdened with stringent regulatory requirements which add hundreds of dollars to the cost of each vehicle and billions to the industry's capital requirements. Regulation also diverts engineering and managerial talent from the industry's adjustment problems.

#### The Industry Retains Tremendous Strengths

- o Despite its unprecedented problems, the U.S. auto industry has tremendous economic and competitive strengths. It is now engaged in a \$70-880 billion program of new investment to modernize its plants and make its products more competitive. This program has already resulted in lower production costs and the introduction of technologically advanced, fuel-efficient, front-wheel drive models.

To address the problems and exploit the strengths of this important sector of our economy, the President has adopted a program of economic recovery, regulatory relief, and other important measures.

#### THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM

The cornerstone of the President's initiative for the auto industry is his Economic Recovery Program, including spending cuts, tax reforms, and General regulatory relief. There is simply no doubt that revitalization of the economy is the single most important remedy for the auto industry's problems.

#### Stimulating Sales, Profits, and Jobs

- o The Economic Recovery Program will provide immediate relief to the industry by stimulating the sales of new cars and trucks:
- o Renewed growth in real incomes and higher employment will give consumers added income to buy new cars.
- o Reduced interest rates will lower the costs of automobile financing, further encouraging new car sales.
- o The investment tax credit provided under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System will increase commercial and fleet purchases of new cars and trucks.
- o A stable economic environment will renew consumer confidence and encourage individuals who have deferred purchases in recent years to buy new cars and trucks.

The sales recovery induced by the President's program will improve the industry's financial condition and restore job opportunities:

- o Sales of new cars (foreign and domestic) should rise from approximately 9 million units in 1980 to 11 million units by 1982 and 12 million by 1983; truck sales should show similar growth.

- o Since every 500,000 units of additional car or truck sales generate nearly \$1 billion in additional net operating income, by 1983 this should amount to an additional \$6 billion per year (before taxes) for U.S. auto makers.
- o Increased production should permit the rehiring of most unemployed auto workers by the end of 1982.

#### Improving Productivity and Lowering Unit Costs

Over the longer term, the most important effect of the Economic Recovery Program will be to reduce production costs, thereby improving the industry's international competitive position:

- o Higher production volumes will mean lower unit costs due to economies of scale.
- o Lower inflation rates and reduced federal borrowing will lower the cost to the industry of capital necessary for plant modernization.
- o Tax reductions for individual taxpayers and lower rates of inflation should also moderate pressures for costly wage settlements and contribute to a more stable environment for collective bargaining and labor relations.

#### REGULATORY RELIEF

President Reagan is committed to reducing the excessive burdens of regulation throughout the economy and has established a Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by the Vice President, to oversee that process. The Presidential Task Force and the Executive branch regulatory agencies will give high priority to relief for the auto industry. These measures will result in considerable savings in capital costs to the industry and even greater savings to consumers.

The President recognizes the importance of protecting health, safety, and the environment. Nevertheless, some of the regulations governing the auto industry's plants and products are unnecessarily stringent, and can be relaxed or rescinded with little or no cost to worthwhile regulatory goals. Other regulations now pending may be needed over the long run, but can be safely postponed until the industry has completed its structural adaptation.

Regulatory relief will benefit the auto industry and its customers by:

- o Reducing substantially the cost of producing and operating a new car or truck. This will not only benefit consumers but further stimulate sales.
- o Freeing capital needed for essential investments in new plant and equipment.
- o Improving U.S. manufacturers' international competitive position.

Working together, the Auto Industry Task Force, the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, and the major regulatory agencies have developed a four-part program:

(1) 34 Specific Regulatory Actions

The Acting Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) have today submitted to the Federal Register notices of intent to rescind, revise, or repropose a total of 34 specific regulations. EPA and NHTSA estimate that over the next five years these actions would save the auto industry more than \$1.3 billion in capital that can be used instead for needed plant modernization. In addition, these actions will save consumers more than \$8.0 billion over the next five years. The actions are described in considerable detail in the attachment.

(2) Statutory Requirements for High Altitude Emissions

As part of the proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act, EPA will ask Congress to eliminate the requirement that all passenger cars meet 1984 emissions standards at high altitudes. This action alone would save \$38 million in capital costs and \$1.3 billion in consumer costs over five years.

As shown in the table below, the combined savings generated by this legislative change and by the 34 specific regulatory actions just described amount to \$1.4 billion in capital costs and \$9.3 billion in consumer costs, or about \$150 per car or truck.

Savings from Actions to be Taken by EPA and NHTSA  
(\$ billions over 5 years)

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Capital</u>	<u>Consumer</u>
EPA	\$0.8	5.0
NHTSA	0.6	
Total	\$1.4	
		\$9.3

(3) Regulations Earmarked for More Intensive Review

EPA and NHTSA have identified additional regulations on which immediate action is not possible, but which are important candidates for regulatory relief. These regulations, also listed in the attachment, will be reviewed to see whether they should be revised or rescinded.

(4) Longer Range Reforms

The President's program to reduce the regulatory burden on the auto industry will be expanded to include:

- o Regulations administered by executive agencies other than EPA and NHTSA.
- o Regulations where potential cost savings are not as immediate as the other announced actions.
- o Additional changes in the Clean Air Act and other basic regulatory statutes.

OTHER POLICY INITIATIVES

The President's program of economic recovery and regulatory relief will materially improve the condition of the U.S. auto industry, but more can--and will--be done to reinvigorate this industry:

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Antitrust

- o The President has asked the Attorney General to expedite consideration of the industry's request to vacate the 1969 "smog decree" as soon as a pending appeal has been concluded. The decree prohibits certain joint statements by the industry to governmental agencies concerned with auto emission and safety standards and exchanges of certain technical information on emission control devices.
- o The Department of Transportation (NHTSA) will waive the prohibition on joint submissions on all of its future regulatory initiatives.
- o EPA will adopt a liberal waiver policy and consider requests to make joint statements on a case-by-case basis.
- o The Federal Trade Commission has on its own initiative withdrawn subpoenas for records in its long-standing investigation of the auto industry. The FTC has concluded that substantial changes in the industry have occurred since the investigation began in 1976.

Labor

- o The Department of Labor is proposing to provide increased assistance to displaced auto workers by restructuring Federal programs for retraining and relocation through the existing employment and training delivery system.

Accelerated Federal Procurements

- o The Administration is proposing to accelerate the Federal procurement of motor vehicles by \$100 million in the current fiscal year, an action which would also reduce operating costs of the federal automobile fleet.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

## Office of the Press Secretary

April 6, 1981

## FACT SHEET

## President Reagan's Program for the U.S. Automobile Industry

Promptly after taking office, President Reagan appointed a Cabinet-level Task Force to examine the problems of the U.S. auto industry. Based on the advice of the Task Force and other Presidential advisers, he has adopted a positive program to address directly the immediate problems of depressed sales, record losses, and severe unemployment. The program also addresses the industry's critical longer term needs to offer new competitive models and to reduce unit costs.

## BACKGROUND ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY

The Situation is Serious

- o In 1980 a stagnant and inflationary economy reduced sales of U.S.-made cars to the lowest point in 19 years. Compared with only three years earlier, total auto sales (domestic and imported) were down 20 percent, and sales of light trucks and vans were down 35 percent.
- o The domestic companies incurred unprecedented losses of \$4.3 billion in 1980.
- o The downturn in auto sales has exacted a severe human toll. Over 180,000 auto workers are on indefinite layoff, 300,000 more are estimated to be unemployed in supplier industries, and another 100,000 are out of work in the dealer network.
- o Not only are sales depressed because of the stagnant economy, but the U.S. auto industry has experienced a dramatic change in its markets, induced by escalating energy prices. As gasoline increased from 70¢ per gallon in January 1979 to \$1.35 per gallon in February 1981, consumer demand shifted dramatically to small cars. Partly as a result, imports increased from 18 percent to 28 percent of all auto sales during that same period.

The Problems are Longer Term as well as Cyclical

In summary, the President's program addresses those fundamental problems of the industry fostered by the Government itself, thereby restoring needed sales, jobs, and profitability in the short term, while also encouraging the retooling, productivity improvements, and cost reductions that are critical for the industry over the longer term.

-2-

- o The auto industry is also burdened with stringent regulatory requirements which add hundreds of dollars to the cost of each vehicle and billions to the industry's capital requirements. Regulation also diverts engineering and managerial talent from the industry's adjustment problems.

#### The Industry Retains Tremendous Strengths

- o Despite its unprecedented problems, the U.S. auto industry has tremendous economic and competitive strengths. It is now engaged in a \$70-\$80 billion program of new investment to modernize its plants and make its products more competitive. This program has already resulted in lower production costs and the introduction of technologically advanced, fuel-efficient, front-wheel drive models.

To address the problems and exploit the strengths of this important sector of our economy, the President has adopted a program of economic recovery, regulatory relief, and other important measures.

#### THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM

The cornerstone of the President's initiative for the auto industry is his Economic Recovery Program, including spending cuts, tax reforms, and general regulatory relief. There is simply no doubt that revitalization of the economy is the single most important remedy for the auto industry's problems.

#### Stimulating Sales, Profits, and Jobs

The Economic Recovery Program will provide immediate relief to the industry by stimulating the sales of new cars and trucks:

- o Renewed growth in real incomes and higher employment will give consumers added income to buy new cars.
- o Reduced interest rates will lower the costs of automobile financing, further encouraging new car sales.
- o The investment tax credit provided under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System will increase commercial and fleet purchases of new cars and trucks.
- o A stable economic environment will renew consumer confidence and encourage individuals who have deferred purchases in recent years to buy new cars and trucks.

The sales recovery induced by the President's program will improve the industry's financial condition and restore job opportunities:

- o Sales of new cars (foreign and domestic) should rise from approximately 9 million units in 1980 to 11 million units by 1982 and 12 million by 1983; truck sales should show similar growth.
- o Since every 500,000 units of additional car or truck sales generate nearly \$1 billion in additional net operating income, by 1983 this should amount to an additional \$6 billion per year (before taxes) for U.S. auto makers.
- o Increased production should permit the rehiring of most unemployed auto workers by the end of 1982.

#### Improving Productivity and Lowering Unit Costs

Over the longer term, the most important effect of the Economic Recovery Program will be to reduce production costs, thereby improving the industry's international competitive position:

- o Higher production volumes will mean lower unit costs due to economies of scale.
- o Lower inflation rates and reduced federal borrowing will lower the cost to the industry of capital necessary for plant modernization.

- o Tax reductions for individual taxpayers and lower rates of inflation should also moderate pressures for costly wage settlements and contribute to a more stable environment for collective bargaining and labor relations.

#### REGULATORY RELIEF

President Reagan is committed to reducing the excessive burdens of regulation throughout the economy and has established a Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by the Vice President, to oversee that process. The Presidential Task Force and the Executive branch regulatory agencies will give high priority to relief for the auto industry. These measures will result in considerable savings in capital costs to the industry and even greater savings to consumers.

-3-

The President recognizes the importance of protecting health, safety, and the environment. Nevertheless, some of the regulations governing the auto industry's plants and products are unnecessarily stringent, and can be relaxed or rescinded with little or no cost to worthwhile regulatory goals. Other regulations now pending may be needed over the long run, but can be safely postponed until the industry has completed its structural adaptation.

Regulatory relief will benefit the auto industry and its customers by:

- o Reducing substantially the cost of producing and operating a new car or truck. This will not only benefit consumers but further stimulate sales.
- o Freeing capital needed for essential investments in new plant and equipment.
- o Improving U.S. manufacturers' international competitive position.

Working together, the Auto Industry Task Force, the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, and the major regulatory agencies have developed a four-part program:

(1) 34 Specific Regulatory Actions

The Acting Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) have today submitted to the Federal Register notices of intent to rescind, revise, or repropose a total of 34 specific regulations. EPA and NHTSA estimate that over the next five years these actions would save the auto industry more than \$1.3 billion in capital that can be used instead for needed plant modernization. In addition, these actions will save consumers more than \$8.0 billion over the next five years. The actions are described in considerable detail in the attachment.

(2) Statutory Requirements for High Altitude Emissions

As part of the proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act, EPA will ask Congress to eliminate the requirement that all passenger cars meet 1984 emissions standards at high altitudes. This action alone would save \$38 million in capital costs and \$1.3 billion in consumer costs over five years.

As shown in the table below, the combined savings generated by this legislative change and by the 34 specific regulatory actions just described amount to \$1.4 billion in capital costs and \$9.3 billion in consumer costs, or about \$150 per car or truck.

Savings from Actions to be Taken by EPA and NHTSA  
(\$ billions over 5 years)

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Capital</u>	<u>Consumer</u>
EPA	\$0.8	\$4.3
NHTSA	0.6	5.0
Total	\$1.4	\$9.3

(Estimates include savings for high altitude requirements and for 27 of 34 regulatory actions; estimated savings on remaining 7 actions are not available. Source of estimates: EPA and NHTSA (industry estimates typically run much higher).)

(3) Regulations Earmarked for More Intensive Review

EPA and NHTSA have identified additional regulations on which immediate action is not possible, but which are important candidates for regulatory relief. These regulations, also listed in the attachment, will be reviewed to see whether they should be revised or rescinded.

(4) Longer Range Reforms

The President's program to reduce the regulatory burden on the auto industry will be expanded to include:

- o Regulations administered by executive agencies other than EPA and NHTSA.
- o Regulations where potential cost savings are not as immediate as the other announced actions.
- o Additional changes in the Clean Air Act and other basic regulatory statutes.

OTHER POLICY INITIATIVES

The President's program of economic recovery and regulatory relief will materially improve the condition of the U.S. auto industry, but more can--and will--be done to reinvigorate this industry:

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## NOTICE OF INTENT TRANSMITTED

TO FEDERAL REGISTER ON APRIL 6, 1981

Antitrust

BY ACTING EPA ADMINISTRATOR

WALTER G. BARBER, JR.

- o The President has asked the Attorney General to expedite consideration of the industry's request to vacate the 1969 "smog decree" as soon as a pending appeal has been concluded. The decree prohibits certain joint statements by the industry to governmental agencies concerned with auto emission and safety standards and exchanges of certain technical information on emission control devices.
- o The Department of Transportation (NHTSA) will waive the prohibition on joint submissions on all of its future regulatory initiatives.
- o EPA will adopt a liberal waiver policy and consider requests to make joint statements on a case-by-case basis.
- o The Federal Trade Commission has on its own initiative withdrawn subpoenas for records in its long-standing investigation of the auto industry. The FTC has concluded that substantial changes in the industry have occurred since the investigation began in 1976.

Labor

- o The Department of Labor is proposing to provide increased assistance to displaced auto workers by restructuring Federal programs for retraining and relocation through the existing employment and training delivery system.

Accelerated Federal Procurements

- o The Administration is proposing to accelerate the Federal procurement of motor vehicles by \$100 million in the current fiscal year, an action which would also reduce operating costs of the federal automobile fleet.

In summary, the President's program addresses those fundamental problems of the industry fostered by the Government itself, thereby restoring needed sales, jobs, and profitability in the short term, while also encouraging the retooling, productivity improvements, and cost reductions that are critical for the industry over the longer term.

## SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:

In light of the serious financial problems facing the motor vehicle industry, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has reviewed its regulations to identify administrative changes which could reduce the regulatory burden on the industry without significantly affecting air quality. The purpose of this notice is to describe the immediate and long-term actions EPA intends to take to reduce regulatory pressures on the industry.

Rulemaking or other administrative proceedings will be necessary to implement many of these actions. Where rulemaking and other actions are necessary, EPA intends to initiate them by the dates specified for items described below.

EPA estimates that these actions will result in savings to the motor vehicle industry of \$817 million and a consumer cost savings of \$4.3 billion over the next five years.

Following are descriptions of the actions EPA intends to take:

1. Revise the statutory HC and CO standards for heavy-duty trucks to a level that would not require catalysts.

EPA intends to revise the 1984 model-year hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide standards for heavy-duty trucks to a level that would not require the manufacturers to use catalysts on their gasoline-powered heavy trucks.

EPA will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking on this action by September 1981.

2. Relax the 10 percent Acceptable Quality Level to 40 percent for assembly-line testing of light and heavy trucks.

Exhaust emission regulations for light and heavy trucks, respectively, specify that light trucks and heavy-duty engines must not exceed a failure rate of 10 percent during assembly-line testing. 45 Fed. Reg. 63734 (September 25, 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 4136 (January 21, 1980). This was a new requirement for heavy-duty engines and a change from the 40 percent AQL for light trucks. Automobiles are required to meet only a 40 percent AQL. EPA intends to revise its rules for both light and heavy trucks to require a 40 percent AQL, making the allowed failure rate consistent with that for automobiles.

EPA will propose these amendments by September 1981.

3. Delay assembly-line testing for heavy-duty engines.

EPA intends to delay for two years all assembly line testing (called selective enforcement audits) of 1984 and later model year heavy-duty engines for exhaust emissions. This will allow the manufacturers additional time to phase in the new transient test equipment required by the 1984 heavy-duty engine regulations.

EPA will propose this delay in the notice of proposed rulemaking for revision of the HC and CO standards for heavy-duty engines, to be published by September 1981.

4. Relax the statutory NO<sub>x</sub> emissions limits for heavy-duty engines.

Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act requires a 75 percent reduction in heavy-duty NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from 1969 levels emitted from gasoline engines; however, this requirement is subject to revision by the Administrator after determining the maximum

degree of emission reduction that can reasonably be expected to be available for production.

Studies indicate that there are major technological problems for diesel-powered heavy-duty engines in meeting the statutory NO<sub>x</sub> limit. EPA intends to propose a NO<sub>x</sub> standard for all heavy-duty vehicles that represents the level that can be achieved by diesel engines. This standard would apply for three years.

The Agency will publish a notice this month announcing that the public hearing on this matter will be delayed at the request of the industry. Because of the industry-requested delay, EPA will not propose the heavy-duty NO<sub>x</sub> emission standard until May 1982.

5. Institute NO<sub>x</sub> emission averaging for light and heavy trucks.

EPA will propose to adopt an emission averaging scheme for manufacturers to meet the NO<sub>x</sub> emission reduction requirement for light-duty trucks and heavy-duty engines. Averaging should provide manufacturers with additional flexibility without significantly increasing total emissions.

The Agency has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for NO<sub>x</sub> averaging, 45 Fed. Reg. 79382 (November 28, 1980), and intends to propose an averaging scheme by May 1982, concurrent with the proposed NO<sub>x</sub> standard for heavy-duty engines.

6. Institute emission averaging for diesel particulate emissions.

EPA will propose alternative diesel particulate averaging schemes to replace the individual-vehicle standards currently in place for 1985. Averaging should allow manufacturers to employ the most cost-effective control technology strategies for their diesel models, while assuring that total particulate levels will not significantly increase beyond those allowable under the current regulations.

EPA intends to propose alternative averaging schemes by September 1981.

7. Eliminate the 1984 high-altitude requirement.

The Clean Air Act currently requires that 1984 model-year cars meet applicable emission standards at all altitudes. Section 202(f) of the Clean Air Act. EPA will request that Congress eliminate this requirement. This change will be included as part of the Administration's coordinated effort on revisions to the Clean Air Act.

8. Adopt a self-certification program for vehicles to be sold at high altitude.

Under existing regulations, vehicles to be sold at designated high-altitude areas must undergo prescribed high-altitude certification testing. 45 Fed. Reg. 66984 (October 8, 1980). EPA intends to substitute a program under which manufacturers self-certify that their vehicles will meet applicable standards. As an alternative to certification EPA will increase its emphasis on monitoring in-use vehicles at high altitudes to verify compliance with standards.

EPA will promulgate regulations accomplishing these changes by April 15, 1981, effective for model year 1982.

9. Forgo assembly-line testing at high altitudes.

Assembly-line testing for compliance with high-altitude emission standards currently requires testing under high-altitude conditions. 45 Fed. Reg. 66984 (October 8, 1980). Accordingly, to perform selective enforcement audit tests, manufacturers would be required either to construct test facilities in high-altitude areas or to contract with high-altitude commercial test facilities with limited capacity. EPA has decided not to direct manufacturers to perform assembly-line testing for high-altitude standards. Manufacturers will thus be able to avoid the costs associated with such tests, including the costs of shipping vehicles to high-altitude test facilities.

EPA will announce this action on April 6.

10. Initiate consolidated NO<sub>x</sub> waiver proceedings for light-duty diesel-powered vehicles.

EPA will initiate consolidated proceedings to waive the statutory NO<sub>x</sub> standard from 1.0 to 1.5 gpm (to the maximum extent permitted by law) for all diesel-powered light-duty vehicles through the 1984 model year. This will provide manufacturers of vehicles qualifying for waivers additional flexibility to meet particulate standards, because more stringent NO<sub>x</sub> control often increases particulate levels.

A notice has been sent to the Federal Register for publication announcing the date by which applications must be submitted for consideration in the consolidated proceedings and the date of the hearing on the applications.

11. Initiate consolidated CO waiver proceedings for light-duty vehicles.

EPA will initiate consolidated proceedings to waive the statutory CO standard from 3.4 to 7.0 gpm (to the maximum extent permitted by law) for classes of 1982 model-year light-duty vehicles not previously produced to meet the 3.4 gpm standard.

A notice has been sent to the Federal Register for publication announcing the date by which applications must be submitted for consideration in the consolidated proceedings and the date of the hearings on the applications.

12. Adopt equivalent non-methane hydrocarbon standards as an option for all vehicles.

Current emission standards for hydrocarbons limit total hydrocarbon emissions including methane, a non-reactive hydrocarbon. Methane does not react with other pollutants to form smog. State-of-the-art measurement technology permits separate measurement of the non-methane component of hydrocarbon emissions. EPA intends to develop non-methane hydrocarbon standards equivalent to current total hydrocarbon standards as an option for all vehicles.

EPA will propose a rule establishing equivalent non-methane hydrocarbon standards by November 1, 1981.

13. Do not require use of onboard technology for the control of hydrocarbon emissions resulting from the fueling of motor vehicles.

EPA is charged with determining the feasibility and desirability of requiring motor vehicles to be equipped to control hydrocarbon emissions during motor vehicle fueling. Section 202(a)(6) of the Clean Air Act. EPA has decided not to require motor vehicles to be equipped with this technology. The Agency's findings will be published in the Federal Register in June 1981.

14. Further streamline the motor vehicle certification program.

EPA will make changes in the administrative process by which motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines are certified for compliance with applicable exhaust emission standards. 40 C.F.R. Part 86, Subpart A. This effort will focus on reducing paperwork and increasing industry flexibility but will include steps to assure that in-use compliance will not suffer.

EPA will promulgate regulations effecting these changes in the certification program by October 1, 1981, effective for the 1983 model year.

15. Relax test vehicle exemption requirements.

Manufacturers desiring to operate uncertified prototype vehicles under bona fide test programs must first receive temporary exemptions from certification requirements. 40 C.F.R. Part 85. EPA intends to review and revise existing exemption requirements to reduce administrative burdens presently associated with this program.

The Agency will propose amendments to the applicable regulations by May 30, 1981.

16. Reduce the annual number of assembly line test orders.

EPA will reduce the number of selective enforcement audit (i.e., assembly line) test orders to the maximum degree consistent with maintaining approximately the current level of compliance. EPA has already implemented a schedule reducing the number of test orders by 22 percent for model year 1981, and 25 percent for model year 1982, assuming no significant increase in industry noncompliance with exhaust emissions standards.

17. Explore deferring standards for paint shops.

EPA will discuss with the states changes in their State Implementation Plans (SIPs) which, subject to their willingness to submit revisions of Plans, would have the effect of not requiring electrostatic deposition of undercoat in the next two years. Additionally, SIP requirements in those states which now require electrostatic high transfer efficiency in topcoat application would be deferred until 1984.

EPA is also reviewing the recently-promulgated new source performance standard (NSPS) for auto body painting to consider the effects of increased use of clear coat.

EPA will discuss changes in SIPs with the states by May 1981, with timing of subsequent changes dependent on the states. EPA plans to complete its review of the NSPS for auto body painting by July 1981.

18. Provide sufficient leadtime for compliance with emission regulations.

EPA will assure, in future rulemakings, that there is sufficient leadtime for compliance with automobile emission regulations, as measured from the date of promulgation of regulations.

April 6, 1981

s/s

Walter C. Barber, Jr.  
Acting Administrator

EPA ACTION #1:  
EPA will propose to revise the 1984 model year HC and CO standards to a level that would not require the manufacturers to use catalysts on their gasoline-powered heavy trucks.

DISCUSSION:

The regulations that have been adopted for the 1984 model year require emission reductions of 90 percent for HC and CO emissions. A new test procedure that measures emission in a "transient" mode (i.e., constantly changing speed) has also been adopted. This procedure is more appropriate for measuring emissions as the service experienced by vehicles in use is transient in nature, instead of long periods of use at constant speeds. A full-time useful-life, which means that vehicles must meet emission standards for their full useful lives rather than for a shorter period (as is the case for passenger cars), was adopted in this rulemaking.

Relaxation of the standards would allow substantial cost savings. Emissions from this class of vehicles would still be reduced significantly even with the relaxation of standards.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that this change will result in a \$108 million cost savings to the industry, with cost savings to consumers of about \$536 million over a five year period. Based on industry estimates, this change would save \$110 million in industry costs; \$900 per-engine cost savings to the consumer according to General Motors and \$370 per-engine according to International Harvester.

IMPLEMENTATION:

EPA will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking by September 1981.

EPA ACTION #2:  
Relax the 10 percent Acceptable Quality Level  
(AQL) to 40 percent for assembly line testing  
of light trucks and heavy-duty engines.

DISCUSSION:

Exhaust emission regulations that take effect in the 1984 model year specify that light trucks and heavy-duty engines must not exceed a failure rate of 10 percent during assembly-line testing. This is more stringent than the 40 percent failure rate that is allowed for passenger cars. Experience with the passenger car program shows that manufacturers are actually producing vehicles with approximately a 20 percent failure rate. While it is unclear at this point to what degree this same benefit would occur for light trucks and heavy-duty engines, the Agency believes that it would be prudent to give the industry the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to meet the emission standards before assessing whether a 10 percent AQL is indeed necessary.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that relaxation of this requirement will save the industry \$19 million in capital costs over a five year period. Savings to consumers over the same period should amount to about \$129 million.

IMPLEMENTATION:

EPA will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking by September 1981.

EPA ACTION #3:  
EPA will delay the implementation of the  
Selective Enforcement Auditing (SEA) program  
for heavy-duty engines for two years.

DISCUSSION:

Another component of the 1984 heavy truck regulations is the adoption of an assembly-line testing program for heavy-duty engines. In this program, production engines will be tested to assure that engines produced on the assembly line meet the emission standards they were designed to meet. The action taken here would delay implementation of this program for two years to reduce the burden on the manufacturers of acquiring new test facilities to perform the transient test. Manufacturers will be able to spread the costs of the new equipment over a longer period by purchasing the equipment needed for SEA testing at a later date.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that this delay will defer \$57 million from industry's capital needs during 1980-85. Savings to consumers over the same period should amount to \$64 million. Chrysler has said that such a change would save it \$3 million; General Motors estimates it would save \$44 million; and International Harvester estimates it would save \$22 million.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A notice of proposed rulemaking will be published by September 1981.

EPA ACTION #4: Affirm EPA's intention to relax the statutory NO<sub>x</sub> emission limits for heavy-duty engines for three years to the level which can be achieved by diesel engines.

DISCUSSION:

In developing regulations to implement the 75 percent reduction in NO<sub>x</sub> emissions for heavy-duty vehicles mandated by the Act, EPA realized that diesel engines would have difficulty meeting such a requirement. EPA, therefore, published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) early this year seeking more data regarding the appropriate level of a standard that could be achieved by diesel engines. A 75 percent reduction translates into 1.7 grams per brake horsepower-hour (g/bhp-hr). EPA projects that a standard achievable by diesels would be no lower than 4.0 g/bhp-hr. EPA asked for comments on such a standard and alternatives to it in its ANPRM.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that this action would save the industry about \$150 million in capital costs, with savings to the consumer amounting to \$563 million over a five year period.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A Federal Register notice announcing a delay of the public hearing at the request of the industry will be published this month. Because of the delay, EPA will not be able to propose the heavy-duty NO<sub>x</sub> emission standard until May 1982.

EPA ACTION #5: EPA will propose to adopt an NO<sub>x</sub> emission averaging scheme for manufacturers to meet the NO<sub>x</sub> emission requirement for light and heavy trucks.

DISCUSSION:

In allowing EPA has been investigating the possibility of manufacturers to meet the NO<sub>x</sub> standards for trucks "on the average," rather than requiring each vehicle to meet a specific standard. This should give manufacturers more flexibility in designing control systems for the wide range of models that are produced.

BENEFITS:

No estimates of cost savings are available at this time. However, EPA predicts manufacturers would be able to meet the NO<sub>x</sub> standards at a lower cost if an averaging scheme were adopted.

IMPLEMENTATION:

The Agency has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for NO<sub>x</sub> averaging (45 FR 79382, November 28, 1980) and intends to propose an averaging scheme by May 1982, in conjunction with the NO<sub>x</sub> rulemaking.

EPA ACTION #6:

EPA will propose alternative diesel particulate "averaging" schemes to replace the individual vehicle standard currently in place for 1985 model year passenger cars and light trucks.

DISCUSSION:

The regulations currently in effect establish a standard of 0.6 grams per mile for 1982 model year cars and light trucks. For the 1985 model year, these are tightened to 0.2 grams per mile (gpm) for cars and 0.26 gpm for light trucks. These standards will require the use of a new technology known as a trap oxidizer. If averaging is allowed in place of the per-vehicle standard, some models should not have to use the trap oxidizer, which will save the industry money without any significant air quality risk.

BENEFIT:

EPA estimates that this approach could save industry \$40 million over the 1980-85 time frame. Consumer savings from this action could amount to \$523 million over a five year period.

IMPLEMENTATION:

EPA will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in September 1981.

EPA ACTION #7:

Request that Congress eliminate the requirement that passenger cars meet 1984 emission standards at all altitudes while preserving EPA's authority to require proportional standards for light and heavy trucks, as well as passenger cars.

DISCUSSION:

The Clean Air Act specifies that in 1984 passenger cars shall meet applicable emission standards regardless of altitude at which they are sold. Since hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon monoxide (CO) emissions increase at higher altitudes due to the thinner air in these regions, cars would have to reduce emissions by a greater percentage at high altitude than at low altitude.

Regulations currently in effect for the 1982 and 1983 model years require passenger cars and light trucks sold at high altitude to meet standards that represent the same proportional reduction in emissions as those sold at low altitude. EPA will ask Congress to continue this authority for all vehicle classes for 1984 and later model years.

Although this change will be handled in concert with the Administration's Clean Air Act initiatives, it is mentioned here because of its importance to the automobile industry.

BENEFIT:

Elimination of the 1984 requirement should save the industry \$38 million in capital costs over five years with savings to consumers of \$1.3 billion.

IMPLEMENTATION:

The legislative recommendation will be included in the Clean Air Act proposals being developed for submission to the Congress.

EPA ACTION #8:	Adopt a self-certification program for vehicles to be sold at high altitudes while continuing to monitor in-use emissions at high-altitude.	EPA ACTION #9:	Forgo assembly line testing at high altitudes.
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DISCUSSION:

Certification of vehicles for sale at designated high-altitude areas can be difficult for the industry because it requires additional certification effort for a very small portion of total sales. Some of the burden is due to the logistics of the certification process. Manufacturers must ship vehicles to a high-altitude area to be tested to determine compliance with high-altitude standards.

EPA intends to reduce this burden in keeping with the direction being taken in the overall certification program. Manufacturers are being given more responsibility to run their own certification programs which reduces the required resources for both EPA and the industry. EPA will allow manufacturer self-certification, rather than requiring specific testing, and will continue to monitor in-use emissions at high altitude to assure that the standards are being met.

DISCUSSION:

Manufacturers have expressed concern about the testing of production vehicles at high altitudes under the Selective Enforcement Audit Program. These concerns have relate mostly to the availability of testing facilities at high altitudes and the ability to secure a large enough sample of vehicles for testing at a high-altitude facility. While these concerns are not insurmountable, EPA believes that resources could be better spent in concentrating efforts on the identification and repair of nonconforming in-use vehicles.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that this decision will save the manufacturers \$175,000 over a five year period. Most of these savings should be passed on to the consumer.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that this reform will save the manufacturers \$700,000. Consumers should also benefit by savings of \$700,000 over the next two years as compared to the current requirement.

IMPLEMENTATION:

This decision is effective immediately.

IMPLEMENTATION:

An interim-final rule on the self-certification program will be published by April 15, 1981, effective for 1982 and later model years.

EPA ACTION #10: Initiate consolidated proceedings to waive the statutory NO<sub>x</sub> standard from 1.0 to 1.5 gpm to the maximum extent permitted by law for all light-duty diesels through the 1984 model year.

DISCUSSION:

The Act allows the Administrator to waive the statutory NO<sub>x</sub> level for diesel vehicles to 1.5 gpm, in certain cases, after consideration of public health, air quality, and fuel economy impacts. Control of NO<sub>x</sub> emissions to the statutory level for diesels is somewhat more difficult than controlling NO<sub>x</sub> emissions to the same level for gasoline-powered vehicles. Waiver of the standard to 1.5 gpm for qualifying vehicles will give the industry more time to develop appropriate technology while allowing fuel-efficient diesel vehicles to be sold.

BENEFITS:

Some emission control hardware costs may be saved, but no firm estimates of savings are available. This will allow manufacturers more flexibility in meeting the particulate standard for diesels and should improve fuel economy and drivability of diesel vehicles.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A notice has been sent to the Federal Register for publication informing industry of EPA's plans to accept waiver applications for 1982-1984 model year diesel passenger cars and to conduct consolidated waiver proceedings.

EPA ACTION #11: Initiate consolidated proceedings to waive the statutory CO standard from 3.4 to 7.0 gpm to the maximum extent permitted by law for classes of 1982 model year light-duty vehicles not previously produced to meet the 3.4 gpm standard.

DISCUSSION:

The Act permits the Administrator to waive the statutory CO standard to 7.0 gpm if certain findings regarding public health, good faith efforts to meet the standards, feasibility, cost, and fuel economy have been made. Waiving the standard for qualifying classes of vehicles for one year should not have significant adverse effects on air quality and may give the industry more flexibility in calibrating vehicles for better drivability and fuel economy.

BENEFITS:

No capital costs would be saved by this action, but hardware costs, which are passed on to the consumer, would be saved. No firm estimates of savings are available, but as an example of the savings, one recent waiver saved \$35 per vehicle for one manufacturer. This could amount to sizeable savings for consumers.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A notice has been sent to the Federal Register for publication informing industry of EPA's plans to accept waiver applications and to accept waiver proceedings.

EPA ACTION #12: Adopt equivalent non-methane hydrocarbon standards as an option for all vehicles.

DISCUSSION:

HC emissions are regulated because some hydrocarbon emissions interact with other pollutants in the atmosphere to cause smog. Industry has always contended that methane, a non-reactive hydrocarbon, should not be included when measuring the level of pollutants that may be emitted. Since the equipment exists to exclude measurement of methane and since there is no debate concerning the non-reactivity of methane, EPA will seek to adopt equivalent non-methane hydrocarbon standards as an option for all vehicle classes.

BENEFITS:

Capital savings to industry are negligible. Depending on how manufacturers calibrate various models, small savings to consumers could occur.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Non-methane HC standards will be developed and a notice of proposed rulemaking will be published by November 1, 1981.

EPA ACTION #13:

EPA will not require the use of onboard control technology for the control of hydrocarbon emissions resulting from refueling motor vehicles.

DISCUSSION:

The Act directs the EPA Administrator to consider the feasibility and desirability of requiring new motor vehicles to be equipped with control technology to reduce uncontrollable emissions from the refueling of motor vehicles. Also, the Administrator is to compare the costs and effectiveness of such technology to that of implementing and maintaining vapor recovery systems at retail gasoline outlets. Pursuant to these provisions, the Agency has decided not to require onboard controls to control hydrocarbon emissions during refueling.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that this decision will save the industry about \$103 million in potential capital costs and could save consumers as much as \$1.2 billion in potential price increases for automobiles.

IMPLEMENTATION:

The Administrator's findings will be published in the Federal Register in June 1981.

EPA ACTION #14: Further streamline the motor vehicle certification program. This effort should focus on reducing paperwork and increasing industry flexibility, but should include steps to assure that in-use compliance will not suffer.

DISCUSSION:

Over the past few years, EPA has taken steps to streamline the certification program, giving manufacturers more responsibility for running their own certification programs. The resource intensive program that did exist was necessary at a time when standards were first implemented and new technologies were being developed. Now that most passenger cars are meeting the statutory standards and manufacturers have become familiar with the testing program, such intense involvement by EPA is not necessary. EPA intends to continue this streamlining process and instead concentrate more on the problem of in-use emissions where more serious emission problems exist.

BENEFITS:

It is difficult to estimate the magnitude of cost savings which can be attributed to this ongoing program; however, manufacturers gain flexibility when administering their own program. This flexibility may allow industry to better allocate its resources and reduce the administrative burdens that have existed in the past.

IMPLEMENTATION:

An interim-final rulemaking to streamline the certification program will be published by October 1, 1981, effective for the 1983 model year.

EPA ACTION #15: Relax test vehicle exemption requirements to reduce administrative burdens presently associated with this program.

DISCUSSION:

EPA regulations permit manufacturers to apply for exemptions from the prohibition on the introduction into commerce of an uncertified vehicle. These exemptions are necessary as uncertified vehicles are frequently used in development and testing programs. The reporting requirements for these regulations were designed to assure EPA that these vehicles were only being used for testing purposes.

The Agency believes, based on its experience in monitoring this program, that it can achieve its objective of assuring a valid use of the exemptions without many of the administrative burdens presently associated with this program for both the manufacturers and EPA. Accordingly, EPA will relax both the reporting requirements and the requirements for qualifications for an exemption.

BENEFITS:

This action would reduce the administrative burden on the manufacturers, but no specific estimate of savings is available.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A notice of proposed rulemaking to relax test vehicle exemption requirements will be published by May 30, 1981.

			<u>EPA ACTION #16:</u>	Reduce the annual number of Selective Enforcement Audit test orders to the maximum degree consistent with maintaining approximately the current level of compliance.	<u>EPA ACTION #17:</u>	Explore deferral of standards for automobile industry paint shop operations.
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DISCUSSION:

To avoid failing an assembly line audit, the manufacturers have voluntarily tested about 20,000 vehicles annually (as compared to 300 to 350 cars annually tested during EPA audits) to identify and remedy emission problems. This response by the industry has resulted in a declining failure rate which should be expected to continue as emission standards stabilize. Since the industry has taken the initiative, EPA can reduce its assembly line compliance efforts to a level which will still elicit the same level of compliance by the industry.

BENEFITS:

EPA estimates that this decision will save the industry \$750,000. Most of these savings should be passed along to consumers.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A schedule reflecting a reduced rate of test orders has already been implemented resulting in an annual reduction of these tests of 22 percent for model year 1981 and 25 percent for model year 1982.

IMPLEMENTATION:

EPA will discuss with the States changes in their State Implementation Plans (SIPs) which, subject to their willingness to submit revisions of plans, would have the effect of two requiring electro-static deposition of undercoat in the next two years. Additionally, SIP requirements in those States which now require electro-static high transfer efficiency in top coat application would be deferred until 1984.

EPA is also reviewing the recently promulgated new source performance standard (NSPS) for auto body painting to consider the effects of increased use of clear coat.

BENEFITS:

Adoption of these changes would result in the deferral of approximately \$300 million in capital investment over the next two to three years.

IMPLEMENTATION:

EPA will discuss with the States changes to their SIPs by May 1981. Timing of changes in the SIPs will be dependent on the States. EPA will complete review of the NSPS for auto body painting by July 1981.

EPA ACTION #18:

Affirm EPA's intention to provide sufficient leadtime for compliance with emission regulations, as measured from the date of promulgation of regulations.

DISCUSSION:

In setting various emission standards, EPA must take into account the time that the industry will need to either develop the necessary control technology or to make other changes in order to meet the standards. EPA intends to provide this necessary leadtime, as measured from the date of promulgation of regulations.

BENEFITS:

This policy will reduce uncertainty for the manufacturers, but specific savings cannot be estimated.

IMPLEMENTATION:

This position will be made clear in future notices and appropriate contacts with the manufacturers. An initial opportunity will be the Federal Register notice to be published this month, announcing delay of the heavy-duty NO<sub>x</sub> and particulate hearings.

ITEMS FOR FURTHER EPA STUDY

In addition to the actions EPA has committed to take to reduce the regulatory burden on the auto industry, EPA is also performing studies and reviews that could lead to further changes in the following areas (some of which would require statutory change):

- o Whether to reduce reliance on (or even phase out) certification and selective enforcement auditing, linked to adoption of a stronger program for identifying and resolving poor in-use performance. EPA will also consider use of emission fees paid by the manufacturer as an alternative to recall for vehicle classes which do not meet in-use requirements.
- o Whether to apply emissions averaging to all compliance programs.
- o Whether to make administrative and legislative changes in the "design and defect" and "performance" warranties.
- o Whether the 80 dB noise standard that is effective January 1, 1983, for medium and heavy trucks should be deferred beyond that date or rescinded.
- o Whether to eliminate the testing requirement for meeting the heavy-duty evaporative emission standard, requiring instead that manufacturers attest to EPA that vehicles, as designed, comply with the standard.
- o Whether there is a need for the passenger car CO standard of 3.4 gpm and NO<sub>x</sub> standard of 1.0 gpm. This review will allow the Administrator to make appropriate recommendations to Congress.
- o Whether the 1985 particulate standard for diesel cars and light trucks is technologically feasible and whether the timing and level of the standard is appropriate.
- o Whether the National Ambient Air Quality Standards should be revised. EPA's review, which is ongoing for most of the standards, will give consideration to the issue of multiple exceedances and will include peer review of the scientific and technical bases for these standards. EPA is also currently developing and refining methodologies for assessing health risks.
- o Whether future additional regulation of chlorofluorocarbon emissions is needed and how the automotive industry would or should be affected by such requirements.

- o Whether the 1984 heavy-duty truck requirements should be further revised based on the results of manufacturers' current heavy-duty transient test programs.
- o Whether heavy-duty engines and light trucks should meet standards for their full useful life or just for their half life as is the case with passenger cars.
- o Whether the current requirements relating to unregulated pollutants impose unnecessary reporting burdens and should be revised.
- o Whether the general pretreatment program and categorical standards adequately consider costs and environmental impacts and properly divide Federal, State, and local responsibilities. This review, which has a broader focus than just the auto industry, was announced by Vice President as part of his regulatory review announcement last week.

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DOT

49 CFR Parts 571, 575

**Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards**

**Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards**

Tire Reserve Load Consumer Information Requirements

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of Intent.

SUMMARY: This notice describes a number of actions the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration intends to take to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens upon the motor vehicle and related manufacturing industries.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Michael Finkelstein  
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking  
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration  
400-7th Street, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20590  
Telephone: (202) 426-1810

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

At the request of the Secretary of Transportation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has undertaken a review of its existing and proposed regulations to identify potential administrative changes which could reduce the regulatory burdens imposed upon the motor vehicle and related industries without jeopardizing the goals of vehicle and highway safety. The purpose of this notice is to describe the efforts which NHTSA has undertaken and the specific immediate and longer term actions by which NHTSA intends to reduce unnecessary regulatory pressures upon these industries.

This notice is not a notice of proposed rulemaking. Appropriate administrative proceedings will be separately taken to implement the actions described in this notice. In accordance with the requirements of Title 5 of the U.S. Code (the Administrative Procedures Act) and regulations of the Department of Transportation, appropriate notices of proposed rulemaking, hearings and opportunities for public comment will be provided with respect to administrative actions involving adoption or modification of NHTSA standards or regulations.

## BACKGROUND

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1392, 1407, hereinafter "the Act") requires that the Secretary issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) that meet the need for motor vehicle safety and are objective, practicable performance standards. There are currently more than 50 standards and regulations in force covering motor vehicles and equipment.

In addition, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1966 (15 U.S.C. 1401) authorizes certain consumer-related regulations and standards of NHTSA.

Standards and regulations issued under these and other statutory authorities impose significant economic burdens upon the motor vehicle and related industries.

Many of the requirements of NHTSA standards and regulations have led directly to a substantial improvement in motor vehicle safety and have resulted in the reduction of fatalities and serious injuries. In some cases, however, such standards and requirements deal with relatively minor issues or relate only indirectly to the legislative goals of the Congress. Some standards and regulations have produced relatively insubstantial benefits, either because they represent no significant change in industry practice, or because after evaluation and review, resulting changes in performance of motor vehicles do not appear to be significantly superior to pre-regulation performance.

Finally, some standards or regulations may have been adopted which, upon later evaluation, involve costs which bear no reasonable relationship to the actual benefits derived, whether or not an adverse cost/benefit relationship was foreseen or foreseeable at the time of adoption.

## SCOPE OF AGENCY REVIEW

NHTSA has undertaken a comprehensive review of: (1) its existing standards and regulations; (2) those standards or regulations (or modifications thereof) which have been adopted in final form but the effective date of which has not yet been resolved; and (3) those pending proposals to adopt or modify standards or regulations which are currently subject to notices or advance notices of proposed rulemaking but which have not been adopted in final form.

In addition, NHTSA has reviewed those ongoing rulemaking efforts which have been subject to public notifications of intended rulemaking, or with respect to which specific comment or advice has been requested from the public by the Agency.

## PURPOSE OF REVIEW

NHTSA has undertaken this review to determine what, if any, modifications to its standards and regulations may be appropriate to reduce regulatory burdens upon the regulated industries without jeopardizing the safety or consumer-related goals and policies established by Congress in its related legislation.

In undertaking this review, each standard, regulation or proposed rulemaking or modification was examined to determine (1) the direct or indirect relationship of the rulemaking in question to the safety or consumer goals of the Agency; (2) the relative importance of the rulemaking in achieving such goals; (3) whether the performance addressed by the rulemaking would be expected to continue at comparable levels in the absence of the rulemaking (taking into account such factors as the size and competitive characteristics of the specific regulated entities, any economic or market pressures or enforceable standards of care established by common or statutory law which might influence maintenance or deterioration of levels of performance, and whether regulated entities are subject to external pressures which would tend to insure achievement of the intended goals e.g., voluntary standards of compliance adopted by industry or professional societies); (4) the costs, benefits and burdens created or imposed by the rulemaking, (taking into account such factors as the difficulty of quantifying in economic terms the value of human life; the amount of consumer information sufficient to allow the public to make free choices in the marketplace; and the availability of specific data to support regulatory determinations); (5) the effects of the rulemaking on innovation and productivity in the industry and any associated administrative costs or burdens; and (6) whether in the absence or withdrawal of Federal regulation, the States would be able or encouraged to regulate independently, thereby making motor vehicle regulation more complex and costly.

In addition to the specific criteria enumerated above, NHTSA is taking into account the type and number of complaints or suggestions received from the industry, public interest groups or special constituencies, and private individuals. The Agency has attempted to identify overlapping, duplicate or inconsistent aspects of its standards or regulations.

Finally, NHTSA has taken into account the length of time which has passed since each standard or regulation has been internally reviewed; changing safety, economic or other factors which may have affected the need or impact of the standard or regulation; and, in this light, the relevance of the policy of the new Administration strongly to prefer the operation of market or individual consumer choices to define and achieve societal goals.

The following are brief descriptions of actions NHTSA has taken or is proposing:

1. Delay implementation of first phase of "208 Standard".  
NHTSA is elsewhere publishing in the Federal Register a final rulemaking to grant a one year delay in the implementation of the first phase of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 relating to automatic occupant protection requirements for large cars (see Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 46 Federal Register 112033, February 12, 1981).
2. Review requirement that manufacturers install automatic occupant restraints, e.g., air bags or automatic belt systems to protect all front seat occupants beginning in Model Year 1983.  
The "208 Standard," issued in 1977, requires automatic occupant restraints to be installed in passenger cars according to the following schedule: large cars in model year 1982 (now deferred), intermediates and compacts in 1983, and small cars in 1984. NHTSA is also completing a notice of proposed rulemaking on what further action to amend standard 208 might be appropriate.
3. Modify the existing bumper standard to meet the statutory requirements that such a standard be as cost effective as possible.  
By statute, NHTSA is required to promulgate a bumper standard which achieves "the maximum feasible reduction of cost to the public and to the consumer" in low speed collisions. Existing standards now require uniform bumper heights and protection from damage to the vehicle and both front and rear bumper systems at speeds up to 5 mph of impact. A major cost benefit study taking into account such things as higher fuel cost and bumper weight has at this writing concluded that rear bumper systems would not meet the statutory test of "maximum feasible reduction of cost." NHTSA will propose amendments to the bumper standard in April 1981, which will propose eliminating the rear standard completely and either eliminating or modifying the front bumper standard, as appropriate.

4. Rescind the "Fields of Direct View" requirements for passenger cars.

This rule, published on January 2, 1981, deals with design requirements for driver vision. At present, no significant safety problems have been identified in long term design plans. Moreover, automobile manufacturers' design lead-times may not permit compliance without substantial costly redesign. Any serious obstruction of the drivers' field of view could be addressed by NHTSA by use of its defect enforcement authority. Accordingly, NHTSA will initiate rulemaking on or about July 1 to rescind Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 128.

5. Terminate rulemaking on "Fields of Direct View" for trucks, buses and multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs).

NHTSA will also withdraw a 1978 NPPM related to the preceding item limiting the size of obstructions in the driver's line of sight and specifying unobstructed critical viewing area for trucks, buses and MPVs. Because of the lack of an identified safety problem, NHTSA will issue a notice rescinding the 1978 NPPM on or before June 1, 1981.

6. Withdraw the ANPRM on post-1985 fuel economy standards.

The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act required passenger cars fleet average mileage rates to meet or exceed 27.5 mpg by 1985 and authorized NHTSA to set post-1985 fuel economy standards. Because strong market demand for fuel-efficient vehicles is expected to continue, NHTSA believes the initiation of rulemaking on post-1985 fuel economy standards to be unnecessary. A notice to withdraw the ANPRM will be published on or before April 15, 1981, and NHTSA will monitor future developments.

7. Amend the regulation creating the Uniform Tire Quality Grading System.

NHTSA's current regulation requires manufacturers to test and grade tires for three characteristics: treadwear, traction, and heat resistance. NHTSA is conducting an evaluation to determine whether meaningful consumer information is provided by this complicated grading system. NHTSA will propose an advance notice of proposed rulemaking or before June 1, 1981, seeking comment upon a

substantial simplification and revision of the tire quality grading system.

**8. Amend the regulation on Safety Belt Comfort and Convenience.**

The purpose of this regulation is to encourage seat belt use by requiring systems to be more comfortable and convenient. It addresses such things as shoulder belt tension, accessibility of buckles and latch plates, belt retraction and convenience hooks. NHTSA has received petitions for reconsideration from all major domestic and some foreign automobile manufacturers. After reviewing these petitions, NHTSA is unable to conclude that the detailed design and locational requirements in this regulation would increase seat belt usage. Accordingly, on or about July 1 NHTSA will propose substantive changes to eliminate all requirements except belt tension, and to defer the effective date of this regulation for one year.

**9. Terminate rulemaking on safety problems associated with Multipiece Rims.**

In March 1979, NHTSA issued an ANPRM regarding performance levels for multipiece tire rims to prevent explosive separations. Since that time, introduction of the problematic multipiece rims has virtually ceased and occupational hazards in service facilities for commercial tires have come under regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Accordingly, NHTSA will issue a notice on or about July 1 that further rulemaking in this area will be terminated.

**10. Recind the Standard on Speedometers and Odometers.**

This standard requires that speedometers be calibrated in both miles-per-hour (MPH) and kilometers-per-hour (KM/H) and that they display speeds of no more than 85 MPH or 140 KM/H. It also requires that odometers be tamper-resistant and indicate whether or not a car has been driven more than 100 thousand miles. Because there appear to be no direct safety benefits to be gained from the regulation and in view of the potential for significant consumer savings, NHTSA will issue an NPRM to rescind the standard.

**11. Propose a one-year deferral of the effective date of the Theft Protection Standard and deletion of the key removal provisions.**

This regulation extended key locking steering column requirements in existence now for passenger cars to light trucks and vans and required ignition locking systems for all vehicles that prohibited the key from being removed while the vehicle is in motion. In response to petitions for reconsideration, NHTSA will consider a delay in the effective dates for these provisions, that is September 1, 1982, for passenger cars and September 1, 1983, for light trucks and vans, and rescinding the key removal provisions.

**12. Propose modifications to the recently issued Hydraulic Brake Performance Standard for light trucks, buses and vans.**

By September 1, 1983, this standard would require upgrading the braking performance of about 20 percent of new light trucks, buses and vans. This standard addresses such things as high-speed stopping distances, fade performance, pedal force levels, parking brake performance, and partial brake system failure performance requirements. Numerous petitions have questioned whether all elements of this complicated standard are relevant or necessary for safe operation of these vehicles. NHTSA will publish final decisions on these petitions for reconsideration on or before June 1, 1981.

**13. Propose termination of the rulemaking on Low Tire Pressure Warning Indicators.**

NHTSA recently issued an ANPRM regarding a requirement that certain motor vehicles be equipped with a device to automatically indicate when tire pressure dropped four pounds per-square-inch (psi) below recommended pressures in order to maximize tire treadwear and fuel economy. Because this objective might be more directly and efficiently addressed as a consumer information issue, NHTSA will continue contracted research and publish on or before June 1, 1981, a notice that rulemaking in this area has been terminated at this time.

14. Propose eliminating information requirements on Tire Reserve Load, and reducing the minimum advance notice required before tire production may start.

Manufacturers are now required to provide consumers with information on "tire reserve load" capacity and to submit this and other information to NHTSA 90 days before model introduction. This requirement for a 90-day notice tends to inhibit or prevent any last minute changes to new models including possible consumer or safety improvements. A proposal to reduce this reporting requirement from 90 to 30 days prior to market introduction and to eliminate the requirement for complex tire reserve load information will be published in April 1981.

15. Terminate rulemaking on design testing and labelling of batteries.

Since January 1977, NHTSA has been considering a regulation to prevent explosions and resulting injuries from automobile batteries. Since then, industry has adopted batteries with significantly less explosive potential, thus lessening or eliminating the need for regulation. Accordingly, NHTSA will publish notice in the Federal Register on or about July 1 that rulemaking on batteries is terminated in view of market developments which have mitigated the problem.

16. Streamline and reduce fuel economy reporting requirements.

NHTSA regulations now require semi-annual reporting of complicated data on manufacturers' progress in meeting fuel economy standards. Because manufacturers are now substantially exceeding current standards and will most probably exceed the statutory 1985 goal of 27.5 mpg, NHTSA will publish in the Federal Register on or before June 1, 1981, a proposal to reduce the fuel economy reporting requirements which are either duplicative or not needed to NHTSA's monitoring responsibilities.

17. Propose changing Federal Vehicle Identification Number requirements from a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard to an administrative regulation.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 115 requires each motor vehicle to carry a unique 17 digit vehicle identification number which identifies the manufacturer, make, type, size,

- place of manufacture, and individual sequential number of manufacture. This number aids law enforcement, theft protection, and accident investigation. Manufacturers must provide NHTSA 60 days advance notification of all information needed to decode a vehicle identification number before the vehicles are manufactured. Errors constitute a violation of the standard and are grounds for recall proceedings. To ease this requirement, NHTSA will propose on or before June 1, 1981, to change its vehicle identification number regulation from that of a safety standard to an administrative regulation to reduce the administrative burdens upon manufacturers and NHTSA.

April 6, 1981

s/s

Diane K. Steed  
Acting Administrator

Date

## FACT SHEETS ON INDIVIDUAL NHTSA ACTIONS

NHTSA Actions #1 & #2: Final Administrative Action to Delay for One Year Implementation of the First Phase of the "208 Standard" and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Addressing Alternatives for Automatic Occupant Protection (49 CFR 571.208)

DISCUSSION:

The "208 Standard" as issued in 1977 required manufacturers to install automatic (or "passive") occupant restraints in passenger car front seats. As so adopted the rule would become effective in three stages: in Model Year 1982 for large cars, 1983 for intermediates and compacts, and 1984 for small cars. Compliance would require using either air cushion restraints (airbags) or automatic belt systems.

The basis for this rulemaking was the extremely low rate of usage of available "active" seatbelt systems. Wearing seat belts could save thousands of lives annually in automobile accidents. NHTSA will be undertaking an extensive campaign to inform and encourage the public on the need for increased active seatbelt usage.

This rule has the largest capital cost impact of any current safety standard. Smaller cars are inherently less safe, and the current phasing in from large cars to small cars reverses the order in which occupant protection would be most needed.

In 1977, NHTSA assumed that all MY 1982 cars covered by this rule would comply by using airbags. Manufacturers now plan to comply by using passive belt systems instead.

In 1977, NHTSA also assumed that where in later years passive belt systems were employed, there would be high usage rates of such systems. Current usage rates for active belt systems in similar large cars are about 7 percent. For safety reasons, even automatic belt systems must be detachable. Some question now thus exists as to the actual usage rates that would apply to the passive restraint systems called for by the first year of the 208 standard.

Finally, in 1977 NHTSA assumed no significant increase in active belt usage, and no major Federal Government effort to increase such usage. Any positive effects of NHTSA's current plans in this regard, which are not quantifiable at this time, would be factors in assessing the adverse impacts of a one year delay in the current 208 standard.

BENEFITS:

According to current NHTSA estimates, total cost savings to consumers from the proposed one-year delay will be \$105 million. Capital investment savings for the industry will be about \$30 million. Over 13,000 automobile manufacturer and supplier industry jobs will be saved.

Further changes to automatic restraint requirements for later model years could save hundreds of millions of dollars in industry investments. A reversal of the order of phasing in protection could save thousands of more lives as smaller cars become covered earlier. If usage rates for the automatic belts otherwise required for MY 1982 were to be 15 percent, or more than double those of current active belt systems, retention of this standard as now drafted might save a total of 75 lives over the projected 10 year life of the large cars involved. If usage rates were to occur at the level of 60 percent, this number could increase to as many as 490 over the same 10 year period.

IMPLEMENTATION:

(1) NHTSA is announcing today a one year delay in the application of the 208 standard to large cars.

(2) NHTSA is proposing several alternatives to further amend standard 208.

NHTSA ACTION #3: Proposal to modify the bumper standard to meet statutory requirements of the most cost-effective bumper system (49 CFR 581)

DISCUSSION:

The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act requires a bumper standard which achieves "the maximum feasible reduction of costs to the public and to the consumer" in low-speed collisions. The standard now requires uniform bumper heights and protection from damage at speeds up to 5 mph, for both front and rear bumper systems. (49 CFR 581)

In 1979, NHTSA concluded that while the 5 mph standard offers substantially greater net benefits to the consumer than did pressstandard bumper systems, it offered only narrowly greater net benefits over 2.5 mph bumper systems. A recent cost benefit study taking into account such things as higher fuel costs and bumper weight now concludes that rear bumper systems would not meet the statutory test of "maximum feasible reduction of costs" even at the lower speed.

Uniform height requirements would be retained but NHTSA is now preparing to propose to (1) eliminate the rear standard completely, and (2) either eliminate the front bumper standard or reduce its level to 2.5 mph of impact.

BENEFITS:

Savings of up to \$650 million per year would be achieved, depending upon the final outcome of rulemaking.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A notice of proposed rulemaking will be published in April 1981. This notice will report on the findings of NHTSA's bumper standard evaluation, and will propose changes to the current standard.

NHTSA ACTION #4: Proposal to rescind "Fields of Direct View"  
Requirements (49 CFR 571.128)

DISCUSSION:

This rule deals with design requirements for driver vision. The rule was published on January 2, 1981, and sets performance requirements for: (1) the maximum permissible size of obstructions (e.g., roof pillars) in the driver's field of view; (2) a minimum field of view for the driver through the windshield, and (3) light transmittance through the windshield as installed.

No significant safety differences have been identified between current long term design plans and general compliance with the standard. However, manufacturers' design leadtimes may not permit compliance without substantial and costly redesign. Should a problem arise over impairment of driver field of view, it could be addressed and corrected by NHTSA in a defect enforcement proceeding.

BENEFITS:

It is estimated that compliance with the standard as drafted would cost GM and Ford alone over \$150 million in redesign and retooling costs. This will provide consumer savings in the amount of \$85 million. Some additional fuel economy and cost savings may be realized where lighter, less expensive metal may be used in place of glass.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will initiate rulemaking on or about July 1, 1981, to rescind FMVSS NO. 128.

NHTSA ACTION #5: NHTSA will terminate rulemaking on "Fields of Direct View" for trucks, buses, and multipurpose passenger vehicles.

DISCUSSION:

A 1978 NPRM on "Fields of Direct View" dealt with the size of obstructions in the driver's line of sight, and other design requirements for driver vision. Final rulemaking in 1981 (see separate fact sheet) covered only passenger cars, because of the complex compliance problems related to commercial vehicles, particularly school buses.

BENEFITS:

Formally terminating rulemaking as to these vehicles will eliminate uncertainty and potential redesign and compliance testing costs.

IMPLEMENTATION:

The NHTSA will issue a Notice in the Federal Register informing industry that the 1978 NPRM is rescinded, on or before June 1, 1981.

DISCUSSION:

The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act requires auto fleet average mileage rates to meet or exceed 27.5 mpg by 1985. It requires NHTSA to set annual increments to reach this 1985 level, and authorized the Agency to set fuel economy standards after 1985.

The industry is now exceeding all interim standards, and all manufacturers will achieve actual fleet averages in excess of 30 mpg by 1985. Fuel economy is now a major market force, which is compelling industry achievement at maximum levels of technology. This has involved unprecedented capital investment (\$70 billion by 1985), and the imposition of further mandatory requirements on the same scale would be beyond the investment capacity of the industry.

Market forces are expected to continue to force improvement at the maximum technologically achievable rates as fuel prices continue to escalate. There is no apparent need at this time for the lengthy, complicated and expensive Federal procedures and technological efforts which would be required independently to determine in advance the limits which might be set in additional standards. To assure that these conditions continue to prevail, NHTSA will continue its detailed analyses of the economic and technological capacity of the industry, and of the economic consequences of introducing substantially larger fuel economy requirements.

BENEFITS:

Withdrawal of the ANPRM will resolve existing uncertainties at this time, and reduce the current burdens on industry to respond to very detailed inquiries and requests for information.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A notice to withdraw the ANPRM will be published on or before June 1, 1981.

NHTSA ACTION #6: Withdraw the ANPRM published on January 26, 1981, relating to Post-1985 Fuel Economy Standards.

NHTSA ACTION #7: Proposal to amend regulation creating Uniform Tire Quality Grading System, to retain treadwear requirements but delete and reserve for future possible rulemaking grading based upon traction and heat resistance.

DISCUSSION:

The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act required NHTSA to publish a Uniform Tire Quality Grading System (UTQGS). NHTSA's current regulation requires that tires be tested and graded by manufacturers for three characteristics: treadwear, traction and heat resistance. Treadwear is graded upon a numerical scale and the other two qualities upon an alphabetical scale.

It is questionable as to whether the intent of the Congress to provide meaningful consumer information is being met by this complicated system. The UTQGS is subject to abuse by deliberate undergrading of tires to promote marketing of other models. Consumers may have difficulty understanding a 3-grade system. Also, dealers may emphasize the relative importance of one graded characteristic over another, thus creating sales pressure inconsistent with actual consumer needs.

The most meaningful characteristic from a consumer standpoint would appear to be treadwear. The characteristic of traction involves a safety aspect, and is perhaps better addressed in a separate safety standard. The characteristic of heat resistance involves primarily fuel economy consumer savings considerations, with some safety aspects.

NHTSA has accelerated completion of a detailed study of actual consumer information effectiveness of the UTQGS. The Agency will publish an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking addressing the considerations set forth herein, and requesting further data and information on each issue raised.

BENEFITS:

Simplification of the UTQGS could significantly enhance the availability of relevant consumer information. The existing regulation imposes manufacturers' testing costs of \$37 million per year, and significant reporting and paperwork burdens associated with each aspect of the regulation.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will publish on or before June 1, 1981, an advance notice of proposed rulemaking seeking data and public comment upon a substantial revision of this regulation.

NHTSA ACTION #8: Proposal to amend regulation on Safety Belt Comfort and Convenience (49 CFR 571.208)

DISCUSSION:

This regulation was proposed as a means of encouraging seat belt use. The rationale was: if seat belts were more comfortable and convenient, more people would use them. The regulation specified such things as shoulder belt tension, accessibility of buckles and convenience hooks. All major domestic and some foreign manufacturers submitted Petitions for Reconsideration of the final rule.

After review of these petitions, NHTSA is unable now to conclude that usage and therefore safety would be enhanced by the physical and psychological characteristics of each individual occupant (height, weight, dexterity, preferences and sensitivities to perceived inconvenience, etc.) are a major variable in the impact of the detailed requirements. NHTSA now believes that only the tension aspect of this regulation can be expected materially to enhance comfort for all users.

BENEFITS:

NHTSA estimates that this rule would cost consumers \$4 million a year. Industry estimated that costs could be several dollars per vehicle, with multi-million dollar tooling costs.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Based upon the petitions for reconsideration, NHTSA will propose substantive changes to eliminate all requirements except belt tension and to defer the effective date for one year.

NHTSA ACTION #9: Cessation of pending rulemaking on safety problems associated with the use of multipiece rims. Occupational hazards would remain subject to regulation by other agencies.

DISCUSSION:

NHTSA issued an ANPRM in March 1979, indicating that the Agency was considering rulemaking requiring certain performance levels of multipiece tire rims to prevent explosive separations. The Agency also indicated that it was investigating the need to ban production of the multipiece rims.

Since the issuance of the ANPRM, introduction of the problematic multipiece rims has virtually ceased. Occupational hazards in service facilities for commercial tires have become controlled by regulations of OSHA. NHTSA has now conducted a cost analysis that indicates an annual cost of \$75 million to the consumer for implementation and \$300 million to the tire and wheel industry for providing the necessary changeover equipment.

BENEFITS:

Decision to decline to regulate in this area would save the tire and wheel industry a capital investment of \$300 million, and the transportation industry as much as \$400 million over the next five years.

IMPLEMENTATION:

The NHTSA will issue a notice on or about July 1, 1981, indicating that rulemaking will be terminated in this area.

NHTSA ACTION #10: Proposal to rescind FMVSS No. 127, Speedometers and Odometers.

DISCUSSION:

Standard No. 127 was issued on June 16, 1980, and would become effective September 1, 1981. It requires that speedometers be calibrated in mph and km/h, with top speed displays of 85 mph and 140 km/h, and that odometers be tamper-resistant and display (1) mileage from 0 to 99,999 and (2) whether or not 100,000 miles has been exceeded. The major objection to this standard was the absence of safety benefits.

BENEFITS:

GM has indicated per vehicle costs of \$1.50. NHTSA estimates that rescission would result in savings of approximately \$1.00 to \$1.50 per vehicle manufactured. This would reduce manufacturers' costs by approximately \$11 million per year.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will issue an NFRM on or about July 1, 1981, to rescind the standard.

NHTSA ACTION #11: Propose to defer for at least one year the effective date of Standard No. 114, Theft Protection, and delete the key removal provisions.

DISCUSSION:

The final rule for Standard No. 114 was issued December 22, 1980. It extended to light trucks and vans the anti-theft and key locking steering column requirements previously applicable only to passenger cars. In addition, it requires that all ignition locking systems be designed so that the key could not be removed while the vehicle is in motion. These requirements are to become effective September 1, 1982, for passenger cars and September 1, 1983, for light trucks and vans.

The NHTSA will propose to delete the key removal requirements for a possible savings of redesign and retooling costs.

BENEFITS:

There will be minor benefits from the extension of the leadtime of the anti-theft provisions for light trucks and vans. An annual consumer benefit of \$10 million will be realized from deletion of the key removal requirements.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will respond to petitions for reconsideration on or before June 1, 1981.

NHTSA ACTION #12: Proposal to modify recently issued hydraulic brake performance standard for light trucks, buses, and vans

DISCUSSION:

Effective on September 1, 1983 for 1984 MY vehicles, NHTSA's recently issued rule would require upgrading the braking performance of about 20 percent of new light trucks, buses, and vans. The standard addresses a number of performance characteristics, including high speed stopping distances, fade performance, pedal force levels, parking brake performance and partial system failure performance requirements. The last requirement would now apply to heavy trucks and buses as well.

Serious questions have been raised as to whether all elements of this complicated standard are relevant or necessary to secure intended safety benefits, in light of current industry practices which achieve virtually equivalent results.

BENEFITS:

Rescinding the rule could save the consumer about 18 million dollars per year, in testing and arguably unnecessary redesign costs.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will publish its final decision on numerous pending petitions for reconsideration and any necessary proposed rulemakings on or before June 1, 1981.

NHTSA ACTION #13: Proposal to modify recently issued hydraulic brake performance standard for light trucks, buses, and vans

NHTSA ACTION #13: Proposal to terminate rulemaking on Low Tire Pressure Warning Indicators

DISCUSSION:

On January 26, 1981, NHTSA issued an ANPRM to initiate rulemaking to require that all passenger cars, trucks and buses be equipped with a low tire pressure warning device (LTPWD) which would automatically indicate when tire pressure has dropped four pounds per square inch (psi) below recommended pressures for maximum load. Such devices could be "active" and consist of attachments to the tire to signal low pressure visible warning within the field of view of the driver.

The principle basis for this proposal is maximization of tire treadwear and fuel economy resulting from optimum inflation levels and corresponding minimization of rolling resistance. This basis is arguably more directly and efficiently addressed as a public/consumer information issue.

BENEFITS:

NHTSA estimates a consumer cost per regulated automobile of \$5 and per regulated truck or bus of \$20, for a total consumer cost of implementation of at least \$130 million per year.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will continue with contracted research addressed to potential new development of devices, but will publish in the Federal Register on or before June 1, 1981, a notice that rulemaking in this area has been terminated at this time.

NHTSA ACTION #14:

Proposal to eliminate information requirements on tire reserve load, and reduce the minimum advance notice which must be given before production may start

DISCUSSION:

Under NHTSA regulation published in July 1980, manufacturers are required to identify to consumers/purchasers the "tire reserve load" capacity, and submit this and other consumer information data to NHTSA 90 days before model introduction.

Reserve load capacity differs by tire model, and is a function of the final actual weight of the standard vehicle. These factors are usually among the facts to be identified for each new model.

The requirement that all consumer information data be submitted to NHTSA at least 90 days before model introduction tends to inhibit or prevent any last minute changes, including those which might be desirable from a consumer or safety standpoint.

NHTSA will propose to permit manufacturers to furnish consumer information as to last minute design changes as late as 30 days prior to market introduction, for good cause shown and to eliminate the requirement for tire reserve load information as unnecessary and excessively complex.

BENEFITS:

Changing reporting requirements from 90 days to 30 days advance notice when vehicle changes occur allows manufacturers greater flexibility both in preparing and disseminating consumer information material and in product planning. Elimination of tire reserve load information requirements will reduce reporting, testing and recordkeeping requirements.

IMPLEMENTATION:

A proposal to amend consumer information reporting requirements will be published in April 1981.

NHTSA ACTION #15: Cessation of rulemaking action on design, testing and labelling of batteries

DISCUSSION:

Since January 1977, NHTSA has been considering rulemaking to establish a standard and prescribe test procedures applicable to new and replacement auto batteries to prevent explosions and resulting injuries. The standard under development would require design and vent systems, instruction manuals and labelling, and laboratory compliance test to determine battery capability to minimize the potential of explosions.

Since NHTSA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission started this effort, industry changeover to superior, maintenance-free batteries with significantly less explosive potential has lessened, if not eliminated, the need for regulation in this area.

BENEFITS:

Discontinuation of rulemaking will save battery manufacturers the expense of design and compliance testing, including the capital investment in testing equipment, and the costs associated with printing and affixing manuals and labels.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will publish notice in the Federal Register on or about July 1, 1981, that rulemaking on batteries is being terminated in view of the market developments which have mitigated the problem.

NHTSA ACTION #16: Proposal to streamline and reduce fuel economy reporting requirements not necessary to NHTSA monitoring of compliance

DISCUSSION:

By regulation NHTSA now requires semi-annual reporting of extremely complicated data on manufacturers' progress in meeting interim fuel economy standards leading to the statutory 1985 goal of 27.5 mpg.

All manufacturers are now substantially exceeding such interim goals and independent NHTSA monitoring of industry efforts makes separate reporting by manufacturers largely unnecessary. NHTSA resources are present inadequate to review the voluminous submissions currently required, and no meaningful purpose appears to be served by the detailed submissions in question.

BENEFITS:

Significant paperwork and reporting burdens are imposed upon industry and NHTSA in the preparation, submission and handling of the required fuel economy information.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will publish in the Federal Register on or before June 1, 1981, a proposal substantially to reduce the reporting requirements associated with fuel economy achievements which are duplicative or unnecessary to the performance of NHTSA's monitoring duties.

NHTSA ACTION #17: Proposal to change the Federal requirements applicable to vehicle identification number from Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard to regulations and to modify advance notice requirements

DISCUSSION:

FMVSS 115 requires that each motor vehicle have affixed to it a 17 digit vehicle identification number (VIN) which must be unique to that vehicle and which consists of combinations of characters which identify the manufacturer, make, type, size, place of manufacture and individual sequential number of manufacturer.

Specific identification numbers similar to the VIN have been required since 1946, as an aid to law enforcement, theft protection and accident investigation. Although initially controversial, NHTSA's final rulemaking is now in force and engineering and recurring costs have stabilized.

The standard also requires, however, that 60 days advance notification of all information necessary to decode a VIN be provided before date of manufacture. Manufacturing errors would constitute a violation of the standard and be grounds for recall proceedings.

NHTSA will propose to modify the form of its VIN regulation from that of a safety standard to that of an administrative regulation to reduce administrative burdens upon manufacturers and NHTSA.

BENEFITS:

Minimal cost savings reflecting marginally reduced recordkeeping and reporting requirements might be incurred, but significant potential costs in the event of a recall and remedy proceeding for inconsequential violation of the standard would be avoided.

IMPLEMENTATION:

NHTSA will publish in the Federal Register on or before June 1, 1981, a proposed rulemaking which would rescind FMVSS 115 and impose similar substantive requirements for affixing the VIN as an administrative regulation of the Agency.

ITEMS FOR FURTHER NHTSA STUDY

In addition to the 17 items specifically identified for action, NHTSA has a number of other standards and regulations under intensive review. Some of these are the subject of the agency's formal evaluation process. These items are candidates for possible reform action in the future. They include such action as:

- o Evaluation of the comments received on the NHTSA proposing requirements for new car crashworthiness performance. Ratings of this performance would be made available to the public. NHTSA will evaluate public comments on the notice, the findings of an international symposium on automotive ratings, and the results of a consumer survey.
- o Review of the public comments on a proposal to modify passenger car bumpers to reduce impacts causing pedestrian injuries.
- o Review of the public comments on a proposed standard for a rear protection device for trucks to reduce the severity of crashes in which cars run into the rear ends of trucks.
- o Evaluation of the costs and effectiveness of a regulation requiring standardization of markings and placement of the controls on the dashboards and steering columns of vehicles.
- o Consideration of the costs and benefits of a rule that requires each motor vehicle to have a hood latch. The rule requires some vehicles to have one latch and others to have two latches.
- o Evaluation of the comments received on a proposed change to the rearview mirror standard. The current rule specifies a number of precise requirements for mirror size and location. NHTSA will look at the costs and benefits of the rule.
- o Review of the rule which requires a "fail safe" mechanism on headlamp concealment devices. The rule also specifies several aspects of the lamp operation, such as operating temperature. NHTSA will examine the costs and benefits of the rule.

\*In addition to these savings, the notices of intent identify 7 other actions (plus a number of other longer term initiatives) that will result in further regulatory relief but for which estimates of savings are not available. The savings estimates shown in this table are in 1981 dollars and are undiscounted 5-year cumulative totals.

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Agency Action	Potential Savings From Proposed Actions	Summary Table	EPA
	Five Year Savings*	Comments	Agency
	Capital Investments (millions of dollars)	Comments	
Relax the statutory HC and CO standards for heavy trucks	108 536	Industry says that this action would save \$110 million. General Motors estimates \$90 per engine in consumer savings.	
Relax the 10 percent AQ to 40 percent for light and heavy trucks	19 129	Incentivization. Harvester estimates it will save \$14 million by this action.	
Delay assembly line testing for heavy trucks	57 64	Chrysler claims a savings of \$3 million for this heavy truck. General Motors \$44 million, International Harvester \$22 million.	
Relax the NO <sub>x</sub> level for heavy trucks	150 563	Change; General Motors \$44 million, International Harvester \$22 million.	
Relax the 1984 high altitude auto emission standards	38 1,300	Requires amendment to Clean Air Act. Ford estimates that this change will save them about \$56 million with this a savings to consumers of \$500 million.	
Adopt self-certification for vehicles sold at high altitude	1 1	Would save manufacturers the time and expense of eliminating test cars to high altitude areas and eliminate scheduling problems.	
Not requiring use of onboard control technology for refueling emissions	103 1,200	Industry says that this action would save consumers \$1.5 billion.	
Reduce the annual number of assembly line test orders	1 1	Would save manufacturers the time and expense of eliminating test cars to high altitude areas and eliminate scheduling problems.	
Explore deerring standards for paint shops	300 ---	Unable to estimate savings to consumer as action by states is unknown.	
Savings from EPA Actions	817 4,317	States is unknown.	
NISSA Delay First Year Implementation of Passive Restraint Standard	30 105	Additiona! savings of as much as \$600 million in investments and \$1 billion annually in consumer costs are possible, depending on subsequent action taken by the Department.	NISSA
All Other NHTSA Actions	352 1,540	Rescind fields of direct view	
Savings from NHTSA Actions	556 4,980	Capital investment estimates are by GM and Ford.	
Total Savings (EPA and NHTSA)	1,373 9,297	About \$150 per car and truck in potential consumer savings.	

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United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530  
Attachment 18

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL  
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

1 C 777 221

#### MEMORANDUM

Re: Proposed Executive Order entitled "Federal Regulation"

The attached Proposed Executive Order was prepared by the Office of Management and Budget in consultation with this Office, and has been forwarded for the consideration of this Department as to form and legality by the Office of Management and Budget with the approval of the Director. The proposed Order is designed to reduce regulatory burdens, to provide for presidential oversight of the administrative process, and to ensure well reasoned regulations. The Order sets forth a number of requirements that Executive Branch agencies must adhere to in exercising their statutory rulemaking authority. We conclude that the Order is acceptable as to form and legality.

The Order has the following major provisions. Agencies must take action only if the potential benefits outweigh the social costs; attempt to maximize social benefits; choose the least costly alternative in selecting among regulatory objectives; and set priorities with the aim of maximizing net benefits. All of these requirements must be followed "to the extent permitted by law." The Order would require agencies to prepare for each "major rule" a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) setting forth a description of the potential costs and benefits of the proposed rule, a determination of its potential net benefits, and a description of alternative approaches that might substantially achieve regulatory goals at a lower cost. Agencies would be required to determine that any proposed regulation is within statutory authority and that the factual conclusions upon which the rule is based are substantially supported by the record viewed as a whole. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief would be given authority, inter alia, to designate proposed or existing rules as major rules, to prepare uniform standards for measuring costs and benefits, to consult with the agencies concerning preparation of RIAs, to obtain approval or disapproval of RIAs and rules on the administrative record, to require agencies to respond to these views (and to defer rulemaking while so consulting), and to establish schedules for review and possible revision of existing major rules. The Order

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would require agencies to defer rules that are pending on the date of its issuance, including rules that have been issued as final rules but are not yet legally effective, and to reconsider them under the Order. By its terms, the Order would create no substantive or procedural rights enforceable by a party against the United States or its representatives, although the RIA would become part of the administrative record for judicial review of final rules.

#### I. Legal Authority: In General

The President's authority to issue the proposed Executive Order derives from his constitutional power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3. It is well established that this provision authorizes the President, as head of the Executive Branch, to "supervise and guide" Executive officers in "their construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone." *Myers v. United States*, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).<sup>1/</sup>

The supervisory authority recognized in *Myers* is based on the distinctive constitutional role of the President. The "take Care" clause charges the President with the function of coordinating the execution of many statutes simultaneously: "Unlike an administrative commission confined to the enforcement of the statute under which it was created . . . the President is a constitutional officer charged with taking care that a mass of legislation be executed." *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 702 (1952) (*Vinson, C.J.*, dissenting).

<sup>1/</sup> In *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976), the Supreme Court held that any "significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law" must be performed by an "Officer of the United States," appointed by the President or the Head of a Department pursuant to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. We believe that this holding recognizes the importance of preserving the President's supervisory powers over those exercising statutory duties, subject of course to the power of Congress to confine presidential supervision by appropriate legislation. See also n.7, infra.

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Moreover, because the President is the only elected official who has a national constituency, he is uniquely situated to design and execute a uniform method for undertaking regulatory initiatives that responds to the will of the public as a whole.<sup>2/</sup> In fulfillment of the President's constitutional responsibility, the proposed Order promotes a coordinated system of regulation, ensuring a measure of uniformity in the interpretation and execution of a number of diverse statutes. If no such guidance were permitted, confusion and inconsistency could result as agencies interpreted open-ended statutes in differing ways.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the President's exercise of supervisory powers must conform to legislation enacted by Congress.<sup>3/</sup> In issuing directives to govern the Executive Branch, the President may not, as a general proposition require or permit agencies to transgress boundaries set by Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). It is with these basic precepts in mind that the proposed Order must be approached.

We believe that an inquiry into congressional intent in enacting statutes delegating rulemaking authority will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by Executive Branch agencies. When Congress delegates legislative power to Executive agencies, it is aware that those agencies perform their functions subject to presidential supervision on matters of both substance and procedure. This is not to say that Congress never intends in a specific case to restrict presidential supervision of an Executive agency; but it should not be presumed to have done so whenever it delegates rulemaking power directly to a subordinate Executive official rather than the President. Indeed, after Nye<sup>4/</sup> it is unclear to what extent Congress may insulate Executive agencies from presidential supervision. Congress is also aware of the

<sup>2/</sup> See Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451, 461-62 (1978).

<sup>3/</sup> In certain circumstances, statutes could invade or intrude impermissibly upon the President's "inherent" powers, but that issue does not arise here.

comparative insulation given to the independent regulatory agencies, and it has delegated rulemaking authority to such agencies when it has sought to minimize presidential interference. By contrast, the heads of non-independent agencies hold their positions at the pleasure of the President, who may remove them from office for any reason. It would be anomalous to attribute to Congress an intention to immunize from presidential supervision those who are, by force of Art. II, subject to removal when their performance in exercising their statutory duties displeases the President.

Of course, the fact that the President has both constitutional and implied statutory authority to supervise decision-making by Executive Branch agencies does not delimit the extent of permissible supervision. It does suggest, however, that supervision is more readily justifiable when it does not purport wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which Congress has allocated to a particular subordinate official. A wholesale displacement might be held inconsistent with the statute vesting authority in the relevant official. See Nyers v. United States, *supra*, at 135; "Of course there may be duties so peculiar and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance." This suggestion is based on the view that Congress may constitutionally conclude that some statutory responsibilities should be carried out by particular officers without the president's revision, because such officers head agencies having the technical expertise and institutional competence that Congress intended the ultimate decisionmaker to possess.<sup>4/</sup> Under this analysis, of course, lesser incursions on administrative discretion are easier to support than greater ones. This Office has often taken the position that the President may consult with those having statutory decisionmaking responsibilities, and may require them to consider statutorily relevant

<sup>4/</sup> Cf. H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies (1962) (discussing concept of "agency expertise" as reason for delegation of power to particular agencies). The Myers Court reaffirmed, however, that even such officers may be dismissed at the pleasure of the President. 272 U.S. at 135.

matters that he deems appropriate, as long as the President does not divest the officer of ultimate statutory authority.<sup>5/</sup> Of course, the President has the authority to inform an appointee that he will be discharged if he fails to base his decisions on policies the President seeks to implement.<sup>6/</sup>

A. The Order would impose requirements that are both procedural and substantive in nature. Procedurally, it would direct agencies to prepare an RIA assessing the costs and benefits of major rules. We discern no plausible legal objection to this requirement, which like most procedural requisites is at most an indirect constraint on the exercise of statutory discretion. At least as a general rule, the President's authority of "supervision" in his administrative control," *Myers v. United States*, <sup>supra</sup>, at 135, permits him to require the agencies to follow procedures that are designed both to promote "unitary and uniform execution of the laws" and to aid the President in carrying out his constitutional duty to propose legislation. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3.

We believe that a requirement that the agencies perform cost-benefit analysis meets these criteria. Further, the President's constitutional right to consult with officials in the Executive Branch permits him to require them to inform him of the costs and benefits of proposed action.<sup>7/</sup> In our view, a requirement that rulemaking authorities prepare an RIA is the least that Myers must mean with respect to the President's authority to "supervise and guide" Executive officials.

B. Substantively, the Order would require agencies to exercise their discretion, within statutory limits, in accordance with the principles of cost-benefit analysis. More

<sup>5/</sup> See generally, 1 Ops. Office of Legal Counsel Nos. 77-21, 77-56 (1977).

<sup>6/</sup> See note 4 *supra*.

<sup>7/</sup> See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2 (President may "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices").

complex legal questions are raised by this requirement. Some statutes may prohibit agencies from basing a regulatory decision on an assessment of the costs and benefits of the proposed action. See, e.g., *EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n*, 101 S. Ct. 295 (1980). The Order, however, expressly recognizes this possibility by requiring agency adherence to principles of cost-benefit analysis only "to the extent permitted by law." The issue is thus whether, when cost-benefit analysis is a statutorily authorized basis for decision, the President may require Executive agencies to be guided by principles of cost-benefit analysis even when an agency, acting without presidential guidance, might choose not to do so. We believe that such a requirement is permissible.

First, there can be little doubt that, when a statute does not expressly or implicitly preclude it, an agency may take into account the costs and benefits of proposed action. Such a calculus would simply represent a logical method of assessing whether regulatory action authorized by statute would be desirable and, if so, what form that action should take. In our view, federal courts reviewing such actions would be unlikely to conclude that an assessment of costs and benefits was an impermissible basis for regulatory decisions.

Second, the requirement would not exceed the President's powers of "supervision." It leaves a considerable amount of decisionmaking discretion to the agency. Under the proposed Order, the agency head, and not the President, would be required to calculate potential costs and benefits and to determine whether the benefits justify the costs. The agency would thus retain considerable latitude in determining whether regulatory action is justified and what form such action should take. The limited requirements of the proposed Order should not be regarded as inconsistent with a legislative decision to place the basic authority to implement a statute in a particular agency. Any other conclusion would create a possible collision with constitutional principles, recognized in *Nyers*, with respect to the President's authority as head of the Executive Branch.

C. We believe that the President would not exceed any limitations on his authority by authorizing the Task Force and the Director to supervise agency rulemaking as the Order does not empower the Director. The Order would provide:

or the Task Force to displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory functions or in assessing and weighing the costs and benefits of proposed actions.<sup>8/</sup> The function of the Task Force and the Director would be supervisory in nature. It would include such tasks as the supervision of factual data, the development and implementation of uniform systems of methodology, the identification of incorrect statements of fact, and the placement in the administrative record of a statement disapproving agency conclusions that do not appear to conform to the principles expressed in the President's Order. Procedurally, the Director and the Task Force would be authorized to require an agency to defer rulemaking while it responded to their views concerning proposed agency action. This power of consultation would not, however, include authority to reject an agency's ultimate judgment, delegated to it by law, that potential benefits outweigh costs, that priorities under the statute compel a particular course of action, or that adequate information is available to justify regulation. As to these matters, the role of the Director and the Task Force is advisory and consultative. The limited power of supervision embodied in the proposed Order is, therefore, consistent with the President's recognized powers to supervise the Executive Branch without displacing functions placed by law in particular agencies.

<sup>8/</sup> The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812, provides some implied statutory support for the Order by giving OMB a direct role in coordinating agency regulations that impose paperwork burdens on the public. With respect to non-independent agencies the Act gives the Director authority to disapprove "unreasonable" agency collection of information requests. § 3504(h)(5)(C). The Act does not authorize him, however, to disapprove the accompanying rule itself insofar as the two are separable. See § 3518(e); S. Rep. No. 930, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1980).

### III. Suspension of proposed and final regulations.

The Order requires Executive Branch agencies (1) to suspend the effective date of rules that have been issued as final rules, but have not become legally effective; and (2) to reconsider rules that are proposed but have not yet been made final. After suspension of final rules, agencies must reconsider all such rules in accordance with the Order. These requirements are imposed only "to the extent permitted by law" and are thus inapplicable when a judicial or statutory deadline requires prompt action. Moreover, agencies must, in complying with these directives, adhere to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and all other laws.

For rules that have not yet been made final, the APA imposes no special procedural requirements. Agencies need not follow the notice and comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553, for nothing in that provision requires an agency to allow a period for comment on a decision to delay final adoption of a proposed rule. The agency's decision may, however, be subject to judicial review, and the agency may have to furnish a reasoned explanation for that decision. See ASG Indust. v. CPSC, 593 F.2d 1323, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The explanation here -- that the agency needs time to prepare an RIA required by Executive Order -- is, we believe, sufficient.

The second category of regulations covered by the Executive Order raises somewhat different legal issues. Under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), notice and comment procedures must be followed for "rulemaking" unless "the agency for good cause finds (and therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure incorporate the finding and a brief statement of reasons (and thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest)." Under 5 U.S.C. § 551(5), the term "rulemaking" is defined as "agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." The initial question, then, is whether an agency's decision to "suspend" a final but not effective rule is "rulemaking" which triggers the procedural safeguards of § 553.

In a recent memorandum, this Office concluded that a final rule should be suspended for 60 days from the effective date of a final rule. Not, in general, do we regard such a suspension as being within the meaning of the APA.<sup>97</sup> We based our conclusion on "the clear Congressional intent to give agencies discretion to extend the effective date provision beyond 30 days" and the absence of statutory language or history suggesting "that a delay in effective date is the sort of agency action that Congress intended to include within the procedural requirements of § 553(b)." Nevertheless, we believe that a short-term suspension of the effectiveness of a final rule is not the equivalent of an indefinite suspension coupled with a process designed to review the basis for the rule, with a view to establishing a new rule. Although the former seems fairly characterized as a mere extension of an effective date under § 553(d), the latter should probably be characterized as "agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule" for purposes of § 553(b).

The difference between these two measures for purposes of § 553 becomes clear upon examination of the sequence of events that is expected to take place under each of them. Under the President's Memorandum of January 29, 1981, agencies are to defer the effective dates of final rules for sixty days in order to review them. The completion of that review will point to either of two dispositions: The rule might be allowed to take effect as published in final form, or it might be withdrawn for some proposed change. The first disposition would require no new procedures. The second disposition would surely contemplate an amendment or repeal of the earlier rule subject to § 553's public procedures, but the earlier deferral of the rule's effective date would remain just that.<sup>10/</sup>

Under the proposed Order, the situation is analogous to the second possible disposition under the President's Memorandum. The Order, by requiring careful cost-benefit analysis of rules through the RIA process, would contemplate notices of proposed rulemaking on the preliminary RIA and a notice of proposed rulemaking on the final RIA.

<sup>97</sup> Memorandum of January 28, 1981, for Honorable David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget, from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel.

reexamination of the rule at the appropriate time. The issue to be decided at the time the rule is suspended indefinitely for the Order's process to take place is whether the rule, which has already been promulgated in final form, should be allowed to have interim effect while it is under review by the agency. We believe that this decision is one of "formulating, amending, or repealing a rule" that requires either notice and comment procedures or good cause for dispensing with them under § 553(b). Admittedly, the difference between a short deferral of the effectiveness of a rule and an indefinite suspension for reexamination is in part one of degree. But there is also a difference in kind: once a decision to begin the process of amending a rule is made, there is no longer a plausible argument that a rule that was to take effect is merely to be delayed for a brief period.


Notice and comment procedures on the issue of the interim effectiveness of a rule that is due to undergo reexamination under the Order should take the following form. The agency should defer the rule's effective date for a period sufficient to allow a short time for notice and comment, an opportunity for the agency to consider the comments and decide the issue of interim effectiveness, and an interval before the rule takes effect sufficient to meet the purposes of § 553(d). In deciding on the interim effectiveness of final rules subject to the Order's procedures, the final question will be good whether and under what circumstances agencies will have good cause to dispense with notice and comment procedures. Public procedures on interim effectiveness might be "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public interest," where 10/. Admittedly, one of the purposes of the 30-day effective date provision is to allow agencies to correct errors or oversights in final regulations. See Final Report, Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 114-15 (1941); *Sammon v. United States*, 460 F. Supp. 458, 467 (S.D. Fla. 1978). This purpose, however, does not suggest that agencies may make corrections, let alone withdraw rules, during the period between a rule's publication and its effective date without offering public procedures or showing good cause for dispensing with them. Proposed corrections -- or even repeals -- would of course be amendments for purposes of § 553(b).

Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, *supra*; National Renderers Ass'n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1261-1262 (8th Cir. 1976); Hiatt Grain Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 502-502 (D. Kan. 1978). The bar on judicial review of agency compliance with the Order does not, of course, prohibit a court from hearing a constitutional or statutory attack on the legality of the Order itself or of agency action taken pursuant to its requirements.

Because the regulatory impact analysis that will be required by the Order will become part of the agency record for judicial review, courts may consider the RIA in determining whether an agency's action under review is consistent with the governing statutes. This, of course, is true of all matters appearing in the rulemaking record.

#### V. Conclusion

The proposed Executive Order is acceptable as to form and legality.

  
Larry L. Simms  
Acting Assistant Attorney General  
Office of Legal Counsel